Research On The Mitigation Of Equity Pledge Risk Of Private Listed Companies By Rescue Fund

The stable development of private enterprises is conducive to improving people’s livelihood and providing a large number of employment opportunities to the public.As of August 2022,the number of private enterprises in China accounts for 93.3% of the total number of enterprises,which has become an important force to promote social and economic development,but the issue of financing constraints has always been one of the practical problems that plague the upward development of private enterprises in China.In recent years,China’s equity pledge market has expanded rapidly,and many major shareholders of private listed companies have taken equity pledge as an important financing method.Since 2018,China’s stock market has been affected by macroeconomic downturn and other factors,the stock price has fallen sharply,and then the market value of the equity pledged by the controlling shareholder has shrunk,resulting in many listed companies facing the risk of transfer of control,and if not controlled,it will even further induce systemic risks.Based on this,the state has issued relevant policies to regulate and control,and under the guidance of policies,various places have established relief funds to alleviate the equity pledge risks faced by private enterprises.With the increase of bailout cases,the operation mode and relief effect of bailout funds have attracted widespread attention from the public,so it is necessary to study in depth how bailout funds mitigate equity pledge risks.Based on the theory of information asymmetry,signal transmission theory and principal-agent theory,this paper briefly elaborates and analyzes the full text from the two lines of how the equity pledge behavior of the controlling shareholder causes the listed company under its control to also face the equity pledge risk and what kind of relief method the rescue fund uses to alleviate the equity pledge risk.Specifically,this paper takes Tang Renshen of a private listed company as a case study object,and analyzes the rescue motives,rescue process and relief effect of both parties in combination with the equity pledge risks faced by Tang Ren Shen.First of all,the basic information of the financial credit assets of the bailed party and the Tang Renshen of the rescued party are introduced respectively.Secondly,this paper analyzes the equity pledge risks faced by Tang Renshen after the controlling shareholder pledges,and uses this as an entry point to analyze the rescue motives,and then analyzes the rescue plan of Caixin Assets to Tang Ren Shen,explains the specific rescue path,and studies how the rescue fund can alleviate the equity pledge risk.Finally,the incident research method and related financial indicators were used to analyze and summarize the relief effect.The study found that it is reasonable for Tang Renshen to choose an equity-based rescue model based on its own business development,and the introduction of the rescue fund alleviates the equity pledge risk it faces in the short term,and the linkage with Caixin assets has also brought it certain industry resources,and its business performance has improved.However,in the long run,the bailout fund can only temporarily play a role in resolving the urgent need,and the future development of Tang Renshen still needs to improve its core competitiveness.Based on the conclusions,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspective of the rescued party,specifically from the perspectives of restraining the equity pledge behavior of major shareholders,rationally planning the use of funds,and avoiding path dependence,hoping to play a certain role in promoting the development of the rescue fund.