Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge,Information Disclosure Quality And Enterprise Innovation Efficiency

At this stage,innovation is the top power of dynamic economic boom,and the report of the National Assembly of the twentieth indicates that it is necessary to enhance creativity to promote development and shape the new momentum and new advantages of development.As the key micro entities of innovation,enterprises can not only gain a unique competitive advantage by promoting their own innovation capability,but also play a very important role in enhancing the whole technological capability of a country.Innovation activities are usually special,with high uncertainty and long cycle characteristics.Investing stable and sufficient funds is the prerequisite for R&D innovation.In recent years,stock ownership pledges have been a significant fundraising channel for stockholders of publicly traded companies due to the ease of financing,fast approval and low threshold,but this financing method carries a greater riskiness while bringing about the convenience of financing.In particular,stockholders’ equity commitments affect not only personal acts but also listed companies.After controlling shareholders make equity pledges,the actual cash flow right decreases,which not only intensifies agency conflicts but also has the danger of switching domains of control.Holding stockholders may focus on the temporary effects on the near term achievement of the company and avoid any investments in high risk items in pursuit of equity price fluctuation,which may have an adverse effect on creativity productivity.Therefore,this paper will take the anchorage point of the above mentioned companies’ innovation productivity and explore how the controlling stockholders’ ownership pledge will generate certain research relevance on firms’ efficiency of creation.The key component of this paper is to synthesize the mechanism of implications and to validate it by solid verification based on scanning the literature and undertaking conceptual analysis.We highlight the implication of holding interests’ ownership plot on the creativity productivity of Chinese firms,and the meshing role of data leakage quality in the linkage among the two.And the tendency to match scoring approach(PSM)and substitution of explanatory variants were used for robustness testing.Further heterogeneity analysis was also obtained in terms of both equity alignment and industry typology.Finally,there is conclusion and relevant recommendation according to the factual evidence.The research finds that: First,There is a significant minus correlation among holding stockholders’ plot and corporate creative productivity of publicly traded companies,and the higher the percentage of quoted shares,the greater the inhibitory power on the creative productivity of publicly traded companies.Secondly,There is a remarkable square association between the quality of data exposure and the enterprise creativity productivity,and the high quality of data release leads to a noticeable enhancement of the technological reality of the company.The nature of discovery acts as a broker in part in the link between holding stocks and the efficiency of entrepreneurial creativity.Finally,The detrimental role of holding interests’ collateral on firms’ creative productivity is stronger when the ownership checks and balances are high.In contrast to conventional industries,the inhibiting effect of holding interests on firm creativity productivity is more obvious in high-tech ones.From the viewpoint of the study of the intermediary function of communication value,this article further enriches the knowledge and comprehension of the link between holding interests’ pledges and enterprises’ creativity productivity,which assists regulators to enforce more rigid disciplining and supervisory rules on plotting,and policy makers to modify and polish the disclosing system,as well as alerting public companies and stakeholders to emphasize on enterprises’ communication quality after holding interests’ pledges,to discipline and oversee holding interests’ myopic behavior,and to make more rational strategies on innovation campaigns,so as to contribute to the upgrading of enterprises’ creativity.