Directors Appointed By Non-state Shareholders And Total Factor Productivity Of State-owned Enterprises

In the new era,China’s economic development mode has shifted from the original pursuit of "high speed" to the pursuit of "high quality",and innovation,as the decisive factor of high-quality development,always adhere to innovation as the core to achieve high-quality economic development is also the focus of the Party in the twenty report.As an important pillar of our country’s national economy,state-owned enterprises still have insufficient innovation motivation and low production efficiency.Therefore,how to promote the technological innovation of state-owned enterprises to improve their total factor productivity is an urgent problem to be solved.The key goal of the state-owned enterprise reform is to effectively integrate non-state-owned capital,so as to realize the complementary advantages of different capital ownership,so as to "strengthen,improve and expand" state-owned enterprises.But how can "effective integration" be achieved? In the past,many scholars focused on "equity integration".However,studies have shown that non-state-owned shareholders who only hold equity do not have a substantial right to speak,and it is difficult to really participate in the internal operation of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,the board of directors,as the core decision-making body in corporate governance,has become a new focus of academic attention.The allocation of non-state-owned directors can not only improve the long-standing governance defects of state-owned enterprises such as "one share dominance" and "insider control",but also improve the willingness of non-state-owned shareholders to share superior resources and empower the operation and development of state-owned enterprises.Then,can giving non-state-owned shareholders board seats effectively improve the technological innovation level of state-owned enterprises by virtue of their resource advantages and governance advantages,so as to enhance the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises?Based on this,this paper combined with relevant theories and selected state-owned listed enterprises from 2013 to 2020 as research samples to discuss the relationship between the appointment and over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders and the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.On this basis,the intermediary role of technological innovation played between the two was analyzed to reveal its internal influence mechanism.In addition,the relationship between the appointment and over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders and the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises may be affected by different constraints.Therefore,in the further analysis,this paper starts from the perspective of state-owned enterprises themselves and external environment respectively.To explore the difference of the influence of the appointed and over-appointed directors of non-state-owned shareholders on the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises in different levels of government control,different functional categories and different marketization processes,and further improve the research content.The results show that:(1)The appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders is significantly positively correlated with the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.(2)The over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders is significantly positively correlated with the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.(3)The appointment and over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders can improve the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises by improving the level of technological innovation.(4)Compared with central enterprises,state-owned enterprises with specific functions and state-owned enterprises with low marketization process in their respective regions,non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors and over-appointment of directors have a more significant impact on the total factor productivity of local state-owned enterprises,commercial competition state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises with high marketization process in their respective regions.In this paper,based on the research background of state-owned enterprise mixing and from the perspective of "board of directors" mixing,an in-depth analysis of its impact on the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises has not only enriched theoretical studies in related fields,but also helped warn that state-owned enterprises should pay attention to the allocation of non-state-owned shareholders’ board seats in the process of mixing reform,so as to improve the total factor productivity of enterprises and achieve high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.