Research On The Influence Of Managers’ Risk Appetite On Inefficient Investment Of Listed Companies

The 20 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that "we must adhere to the theme of promoting high-quality development and promote the effective improvement of quality and reasonable growth of the economy",the inefficiency of investment is one of the important factors affecting the high-quality development of enterprises,how to reduce the inefficient investment of enterprises to improve investment efficiency,has always been an important topic of concern in academia and practical circles.As the direct decision-maker of the enterprise,any decision made by the manager will significantly affect the investment income and development of the enterprise,and the level of risk appetite is an important psychological characteristic factor affecting the behavior decision of the manager.Therefore,from the perspective of behavioral finance,it is of great significance to explore the influence of managers’ risk appetite on the inefficient investment of listed companies.This paper selects the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from2016 to 2021 as the research sample,and analyzes the influence mechanism of managers’ risk appetite on inefficient investment from the perspectives of enterprise overinvestment and underinvestment by combing the relevant literature on managers’ risk appetite,corporate inefficient investment and the relationship between the two,taking principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,behavioral finance theory and financing constraint theory as the starting point.Based on China’s capital market environment,financing constraint variables are introduced to explore the moderating effect of financing constraint on management’s risk appetite and inefficient investment.The results show that:(1)managers’ risk appetite is positively correlated with overinvestment,that is,the more managers prefer risk,the more likely they are to overinvest;(2)The risk appetite of managers is negatively correlated with underinvestment,that is,the more risk-averse managers are,the more cautious they are about investing in projects,and the easier it is to lead to underinvestment;(3)Financing constraints can negatively regulate the impact of managers’ risk appetite on enterprises’ excessive investment,that is,financing constraints can inhibit excessive investment caused by managers’ risk appetite;(4)In the case of insufficient investment,financing constraints cannot significantly adjust the impact of managers’ risk appetite on insufficient investment.In view of the above research conclusions,this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions for listed companies:(1)improve the company’s internal control system and strengthen supervision and management;(2)Pay attention to the construction of the senior management team and comprehensively evaluate the behavior of managers;(3)Broaden the company’s financing channels and control managers’ decision-making resources.