Research On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge On Commercial Credit Financin

Since the introduction of the guarantee law in 1995,equity pledge,as a special financing method,has developed rapidly.By the end of 2020,the total market value of pledge in China’s A-share market has reached 4.32 trillion,accounting for a considerabl e scale.It is noteworthy that while equity pledge brings convenience to the controlling shareholders,there are also some risks behind it.After the controlling shareholders pledge their shares,they may have the motivation of hollowing out their interest s.At the same time,in order to avoid the risk of control transfer,it may also carry out opportunistic behaviors such as earnin gs manipulation.These will have an impact on stakeholders.In recent years,with the transformation of China’s commercial econ omy,the company’s credit has played an important role in promoting its own economic efficiency.Therefore,the research on commercial credit financing is of certain significance.As a kind of short-term credit loan,commercial credit financing is essentia lly the embodiment of credit.When suppliers provide commercial credit,they usually have high requirements for the company’s business ability and information quality.Combined with the previous brief analysis of the risk of controlling shareholder’s equit y pledge,there is little literature exploration on whether suppliers will reduce the company’s commercial credit financing due to the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge.Taking this opportunity,this paper deeply studies the relationship between them.At the same time,based on the analysis of the relationship between the two,this paper brings the marketization process and equity checks and balances into the research framework,and further explores the regulatory effect of the marketization process a nd equity checks and balances on the relationship between the two.This paper comprehensively uses the methods of literature research,normative analysis and empirical analysis to carry out the overall context.Firstly,based on the analysis of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theo ry and private interest theory of control,this paper analyzes in detail the influence of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on commercial credit financing,the process of marketization and the regulation effect of equity check and balance.Secondly,this paper selects the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2020 as the sample,and makes an empirical regression on the content of this paper by using the empirical methods of descriptive st atistics,correlation analysis,regression analysis and robustness test.The study found that :(1)The controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will reduce the company’s commercial credit financing level.At the same time,the higher the pledge ratio,the lower the company’s commercial credit fin ancing level,that is,the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge is negatively correlated with commercial credit financing.(2)When the marketization process is high,it can significantly weaken the negative correlation between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and commercial credit financing.(3)When the degree of equity check and balance is high,it can significantly weaken the negative correlation between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and commercial credit financing.Finally,based on the overall research conclusions,this paper puts forward suggestions and policies for the company,relevant departments and stakeholders,and further summarizes the research limitations and prospects of this paper.