| In 2020,Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges adjusted the delisting standard in the stock listing rules.The main adjustment is to change the net profit index to the net profit index which is the lowest after deducting non-recurring gains and losses,change "par value delisting" to "delisting of 1 yuan",add new standard indicators,detailed illegal indicators,cancel the suspension of listing and halve the period of delisting.This can be expected to make it easier to delist listed companies.Before this,due to the listing standard is too high,the process is too slow,the formation of the value of "shell resources",which leads to listed enterprises using various means to avoid delisting phenomenon.In order to change their business performance in a short period of time and avoid delisting,many enterprises have resorted to manipulating profits,falsely recording financial data and other means.However,such behavior cannot change the fact that they are in poor business condition,and will cause misallocation of resources in the securities market and damage the interests of investors.Therefore,If the delisting system reform can restrain various behaviors of enterprises to avoid delisting,it will bring better protection to investors’ rights and interests.Therefore,this paper mainly discusses how the new rules enable companies to avoid delisting difficulties,and discusses its practical impact.Therefore,this paper studies how the new rules make it harder for listed companies to avoid delisting,as well as its specific effects.The implementation of the new delisting regulation has improved the quality standard of listed companies and cleared the inferior enterprises more effectively.After analyzing the effectiveness of the new delisting rules,this paper finds that it has a good inhibiting effect on listed companies using non-recurring profit and loss,face value and other means to avoid delisting.In addition,with the background of the implementation of the comprehensive registration system,the new system improves the efficiency of IPO,reduces the "shell value" and improves the delisting efficiency.However,it has no obvious inhibition effect on reducing discretionary bank expenses,related party transactions and other real earnings management methods.In order to verify the above analysis,this paper selects case companies that faced delisting crisis twice and were forced to delist in March 2022 due to serious violations of law,to study the delisting avoidance behavior.As this case successfully avoided delisting under the old system for many times,it became the first A-share forced delisting company in 2022 under the background of the full implementation of the registration system.Therefore,this paper studied the data of this case,hoping to find the shortcomings of the new system.In the case analysis,it is found that the new system has a good inhibition effect on the case companies using non-recurring profit and loss,asset impairment reserve,bankruptcy reorganization,information disclosure and false records to avoid delisting means,and it is found that the new system increases the importance of audit.However,the new system still has some shortcomings,such as the serious illegal delisting index is difficult to achieve,the inhibition effect on real earnings management is not obvious,the delisting index has the problem of "one size fits all" and the system of protecting investors is not perfect,etc.While analyzing these problems,the corresponding suggestions are also given for each problem. |