Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation Incentives On Corporate Performance In Chinese Internet Listed Companies

In modern corporate management theory,managers are responsible for the decision-making and operation management of daily business affairs of enterprises,and need to make choices on how to improve the profitability of enterprises,set long-term strategic goals and form competitive advantages of enterprises,and enterprises need to pay corresponding compensation for executives.In order to maximize the motivation and efficiency of executives,enterprises establish executive compensation incentive mechanism to closely link the interests of executives and shareholders,which to a certain extent reduces agency costs.Under the new development mode of continuous innovation of Internet technology and business model integration,Chinese Internet industry presents the distinctive characteristics of high risk and innovation,and enterprises must seize the rising opportunities,and the performance of top managers will directly affect the rise and fall of enterprises,so it is necessary for enterprises to establish an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism.Based on this,this paper analyzes how executive compensation incentives can fully play a role in boosting business performance in Internet listed companies through an empirical study,and proposes corresponding countermeasures based on the research results.On the basis of referring to the domestic and foreign literature on executive compensation incentives,this paper compares the theoretical basis of executive compensation incentives,and then analyzes the current status of executive compensation incentives in Chinese Internet industry before putting forward the research hypothesis.This paper takes the data of 294 listed companies in Chinese Internet industry from 2017-2021 as the analysis sample,and empirically analyzes the impact of executive monetary compensation,executive shareholding ratio,equity concentration on corporate performance and the impact of executive monetary compensation on executive shareholding ratio of Internet companies.The empirical results show that: the monetary compensation of executives in China’s non-state listed Internet companies is positively related to corporate performance,i.e.,increasing monetary compensation can effectively boost executives’ work confidence and help improve corporate performance;executive shareholding is negatively correlated with corporate performance,implying that executives may act to maximize their own interests and affect corporate performance due to their increased voice after increasing their control over the enterprise;equity concentration is positively correlated with corporate performance.Concentration is positively correlated with corporate performance,the current shareholding structure of Chinese Internet enterprises is reasonable,and shareholders will earnestly fulfill their responsibility to supervise the business process,urge senior managers to achieve the expected business goals and improve business performance;executive monetary compensation is negatively correlated with executive shareholding,affected by the downward pressure of the global economy in recent years,the level of executive compensation has declined,and executives expect monetary salary and shareholding,the number of shares cannot be fully satisfied.However,the regression results of state-owned Internet-listed enterprises in China are not significant.This paper focuses on the impact of executive compensation on corporate performance in the Internet industry to provide a relevant theoretical basis for establishing a more reasonable and efficient executive compensation mechanism in China’s Internet industry in the future.