| Under the background of major asset restructuring policy changes,this paper discusses the impact of enterprises’ choice of Reverse takeover on enterprise performance.Due to the tightening policy of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on major asset restructuring of enterprises and the strict IPO review,some non listed companies have implemented reverse mergers and acquisitions of listed companies,completing curve listings in a backdoor like manner.Backdoor lending can help enterprises enter the market to further absorb social capital and alleviate their current financial problems.However,the original actual controllers of non listed enterprises need to give up control,which may affect the long-term goals and interests of the enterprise.This article conducts a more in-depth study on whether the company’s strategy of entering the listing system at the cost of losing control meets the needs of the company’s development.This article selects the case of Asian pharmaceutical backdoor gold and stone Dongfang entering the listing system as the research object.First of all,from the perspective of the company’s development strategy and policy changes,analyze the transaction motivations and Critical path method in the transaction process of both parties,and determine that this major asset restructuring is a backdoor like behavior.Secondly,from the perspectives of the development bottlenecks and prospects of the two companies,the financial decision-making motivations of the major shareholders of Asia Pharmaceutical and Jinshi Oriental under various risks were analyzed.The effectiveness of this merger and acquisition transaction was then analyzed from three dimensions:market performance,financial performance,and competitive performance.Research has shown that:firstly,backdoor lending behavior can help enterprises transform their production and sales models;Secondly,from the perspective of short-term market performance,backdoor lending has brought significant positive impacts to Jinshi Yayao;Thirdly,from the perspective of long-term market performance,financial performance,and competitive performance,backdoor lending has not brought the expected results to the company’s development,but has instead led to a decline in company performance and brought about some inherent problems of backdoor lending,such as complex equity structure and insufficient cash flow.Therefore,backdoor lending cannot efectively become a high-quality way for non listed companies to go public on a curve.Based on the above research,we can get the following enlightenment:First,when encountering the bottleneck problem of development,non listed companies should first consider their own internal problems and effectively solve them,rather than choosing quasi Reverse takeover.Enterprises can increase their own competitiveness and improve their performance through product research and development,market expansion,and talent introduction;Secondly,non listed companies need to adapt to the current registration system policies,optimize their equity structure,strengthen information disclosure,and thus meet the requirements of registration system listing;Thirdly,relevant lending organizations and financial institutions can provide non listed enterprises with a more relaxed loan system to alleviate the pressure of insufficient funds for enterprises;Fourth,under the comprehensive registration system,the CSRC should increase supervision and review on quasi Reverse takeover to prevent enterprises that violate the existing system from existing in the market. |