Research On The Influence Of Corporate Governance Of Commercial Banks On Systemic Risk Spillover

In recent years,China has been extremely vigilant against the systemic risks of the financial industry,launched a “foreign exchange” and “debt”,“the governance of financial order” and a series of preventive measures,these measures are achieved certain results,but there are still a drop in quality of credit assets,rising non-performing loans and other kinds of financial risk the possibility of a rebound,a systemic risk guard not slack off.As an important part of China’s financial system,commercial banks should be the focus of risk prevention.In addition to relying on relevant departments to introduce policies and measures at the macro level,banks should also start from their own perspective to prevent systemic risks at the micro level,and corporate governance is one of the perspectives worth paying attention to.Based on this,this paper studies the impact of corporate governance of commercial banks on systemic risk from the perspectives of shareholders,directors and supervisors,and senior executives.Firstly,this paper reviews the relevant research results at home and abroad,and finds that most of the researches only focus on the impact of a single element of corporate governance on bank risk,and mainly focus on the bank’s initiative risk-taking,while there are few researches on the relationship between corporate governance and systemic risk.Then,the paper sorts out the ways that shareholders,directors,supervisors and senior executives influence systemic risk,and analyzes the current situation of corporate governance of commercial banks in China.Then,the contribution degree of commercial banks to systemic risk is measured,that is,the spillover value of commercial banks’ systemic risk.Considering the fluctuation aggregation and autocorrelation characteristics of financial time series,this paper adopts ARMA-GARCH class model to measure.Then the risk spillover value measured in the previous paper is taken as the explained variable,and the panel regression model is used to analyze the influence of the shareholder level,the director and supervisor level and the senior management level on the value.The results show that: at the level of shareholders,the proportion of institutional investors has a significant positive correlation with the contribution of commercial banks to systemic risk,while the degree of ownership concentration has a significant negative correlation.At the level of directors and supervisors,the size of the board of directors,the long-term residence of independent directors and the bank’s headquarters in the same city are significantly positively correlated with the systemic risk contribution of the bank,while the size of the board of supervisors is significantly negatively correlated with them.At the senior management level,the combination of two jobs and equity incentive will significantly increase the bank’s contribution to systemic risk,while the size of senior management will significantly reduce its contribution.Finally,based on the results of the previous study and the current situation of preventing systemic risk in China,corresponding suggestions are put forward to reduce the contribution of commercial banks to systemic risk.