Research On The Impact Of Executive Ownership And Corporate Financial Asset Allocation From The Perspective Of Life Cycle

The financial investment activities of Chinese real enterprises are increasingly active,but the proportion of fixed assets investment is declining.How to avoid enterprises "from real to virtual" is an important problem to realize the high-quality development of Chinese economy.In recent years,our country is in the critical period of economic reform and development.How to balance the real economy and financial economy is a hot topic studied by scholars.The weak situation of the real economy is prominent,the rate of return of the real economy is falling,and the rapid development of the financial industry,profits continue to rise,which causes non-financial enterprises to invest a large amount of capital in the financial sector.Excessive financial asset allocation by enterprises squeezes out part of R&D investment and fixed asset allocation,which is not conducive to long-term development of enterprises.In corporate governance,shareholders often implement equity incentive schemes to encourage executives to serve the enterprise more attentively.For listed manufacturing companies,the real economy is the fundamental path for their long-term development,so the owners encourage long-term investment by senior executives and supervise their short-sighted behavior.The asset allocation behavior of enterprises cannot be separated from the support of financial resources.By referring to the enterprise life cycle theory,enterprises in different life cycle stages have similar financial conditions.Therefore,this paper adopts the cash flow group method to judge the life cycle stage of enterprises,and takes this method as the basis to analyze the growth stage,maturity stage and decline stage of enterprises respectively.The relationship between executive ownership and corporate financial asset allocation.Due to the rapid development of the current financial market and the variety of financial products,the liquidity of different maturity structures varies greatly,and the purpose and motivation of enterprises to hold are also different.Therefore,this paper distinguishes financial assets of different maturity according to the liquidity,and studies the influence of executive shareholding and financial assets with different maturity structures.In addition,the research on the relationship between executive shareholding and financial asset allocation found that internal control may have an intermediary effect in the relationship between executive shareholding and financial asset allocation.Manufacturing is the cornerstone of our country real economy,so this paper takes manufacturing listed companies as the research object to conduct empirical research.This study focuses on the relationship between executive shareholding and financial asset allocation in manufacturing enterprises and whether the relationship between executive shareholding and financial asset allocation in different life cycle stages is different,and analyzes the intermediary role of internal control between executive shareholding and financial asset allocation,so as to provide empirical basis for the selection of incentive methods and asset allocation in manufacturing enterprises.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The ownership of shares by senior executives will significantly inhibit the allocation of financial assets.With the increase of the shareholding ratio of senior executives,the proportion of financial asset allocation of non-financial enterprises will decrease,which indicates that the implementation of shareholding plan for senior executives can solve the short-sighted behaviors of senior executives to a certain extent,and has a certain urging effect.(2)Through the cash flow method to divide the life cycle,found the present Chinese manufacturing industry enterprise whole in the growth period and mature period,indicates that the whole industry development prospects are better,has the strong market vitality.Through grouping regression,it is found that the inhibitory effect of executive shareholding on corporate financial asset allocation behavior is significant in the growth stage,maturity stage and recession stage,among which in the mature stage,the higher the proportion of executive shareholding,the best inhibitory effect on corporate financial asset allocation behavior.(3)From the perspective of the duration of financial asset allocation,financial assets are divided into short-term financial assets and long-term financial assets through the liquidity level of assets.The empirical findings show that executive shareholding promotes the short-term financial asset allocation of enterprises,but inhibits the long-term financial asset allocation of enterprises.(4)In the further analysis,it is found that internal control has a partial intermediary effect on the influence of executive shareholding and corporate financial asset allocation behavior,that is,executive shareholding can improve the quality of corporate internal control,so as to reduce the proportion of corporate financial asset allocation.Finally,based on the above empirical research results and the academic achievements of other scholars,this paper proposes that corporate shareholders can improve the shareholding ratio of managers by developing perfect shareholding incentive measures,so as to achieve the effect of reducing the financial asset allocation behavior of enterprises,especially for enterprises in the mature stage,this incentive plan will have a better effect.National managers can also create a favorable economic environment by improving laws and regulations related to stock ownership plans,so as to promote the development of the real economy and avoid excessive prosperity of the bubble economy.