Research On Cracking The Quality Signal Failure Of E-Commerde Agricultural Products Based On Platform Subsidy

With the rapid development of the Internet platform economy,e-commerce has become an important channel for poverty alleviation and agricultural assistance,and driving farmers to increase income.However,the virtual transaction method of the platform aggravating the asymmetry of quality information of agricultural products,consumers’ adverse selection has led to the gradual withdrawal of high-quality agricultural products from the e-commerce market,which restricts the current consumption upgrade and the high-quality development of the e-commerce industry.At this stage,the e-commerce agricultural products market has a dilemma of "low quality and low price," and the low-quality problem in the e-commerce agricultural products market has become more and more prominent,Compared with the offline market,the online market has a higher failure rate and non-compliance rate of similar products,and there are more quality problems.At the same time,the "14th Five-Year Plan" ecommerce development plan points out that by 2025,China’s high-quality development of e-commerce will achieve remarkable results,becoming an important force to help the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries and rural revitalization.To achieve the high-quality development of the e-commerce agricultural products market,the overall improvement of commodity quality is one of the contents,and the ecommerce platform should bear the main responsibility.Therefore,in view of the problem of quality signal failure in the e-commerce agricultural products market,this paper proposes a platform subsidy strategy to control the quality signal failure of ecommerce agricultural products,that is,the platform gives a certain price subsidy to high-quality agricultural products,which not only makes up for its competitive disadvantage in price,but also endorses high-quality agricultural products and transmits reliable quality signals.This paper sorts out the relevant literature on the quality failure of e-commerce agricultural products at home and abroad,focuses on the research situation of platform subsidies,quality signals,and quality signal failures,and sorts out the relevant theoretical basis and concept definition,which lays the foundation for subsequent research.Through the questionnaire survey on the purchase of subsidized agricultural products by consumers on online shopping platforms and the descriptive statistical analysis of the questionnaire with SPSS 27.0,corresponding conclusions were drawn,which laid the foundation for the development of subsequent modeling research.Based on the signal game theory,the purchase decision of consumers under two different quality signals before and after the platform subsidy is constructed,the income function of high-and low-quality agricultural product sellers is constructed,the optimal level of platform subsidy is obtained,the changes in the income of sales of two types of agricultural products before and after the subsidy are analyzed,and corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the government,e-commerce platforms,and consumers according to the obtained results.Through questionnaire analysis and modeling calculations,this paper concludes the following:(1)More and more consumers choose to buy agricultural products online;Consumers are more willing to buy agricultural products with platform subsidies than ordinary agricultural products,and their satisfaction is high;Platform subsidies can be used as an effective signaling mechanism to help high-quality agricultural products deliver quality signals.(2)When there is no platform subsidy,low-quality agricultural products are sold at high prices;that is,the profits brought by "shoddy charging" are higher than the sales profits of high-quality and high-priced agricultural products and may also be higher than the sales profits of low-quality and low-priced agricultural products.(3)When the e-commerce platform selects some high-quality agricultural products for subsidies,it can reasonably make subsidy level decisions according to the cost budget and policy objectives,and this study obtains the range of optimal subsidy levels,which provides strong theoretical support for platform enterprises to make subsidy decisions.(4)As a market strategy,platform subsidies are a double-edged sword,and if not used well,they may be counterproductive.It is necessary to fully grasp the market situation before adopting subsidies,because platform subsidies will also harm the interests of those who are not subsidized but are also high-quality agricultural sellers;The subsidy cost budget is an important factor affecting the subsidy effect,and this paper finds that platform subsidies can only achieve the best effect when the total subsidy reaches a certain degree of total amount,they cannot change the market equilibrium and even harm the interests of the unsubsidized high-quality agricultural product sellers.