| In recent years,with the rapid development of fund market,investors and scholars pay more and more attention to fund,especially for fund managers.This paper focuses on the problem of career concern of fund managers,which is easily neglected in the previous literature study.Due to the existence of information asymmetry and interest inconsistency,there are obvious principal-agent problems between investors and fund managers.In order to solve this problem,fund managers are often urged to work hard by adding monetary incentive clauses in contracts.Besides the explicit incentive clauses agreed in the contract,there are also implicit incentives such as fund manager reputation.To some extent,the reputation of fund managers reflects the performance of past work and can have an important impact on future career development.Therefore,scholars generally believe that fund managers with higher reputation will face lower career concern,while those with lower reputation will face higher career concern.When faced with high career concern,fund managers usually choose to take a gamble in order to keep their jobs,hoping to reverse the performance of funds by increasing their risk-taking levels.Through empirical tests,it is found that there is a significant positive correlation between career concern and fund risk.In addition,this paper also studies the moderating mechanism between uncertainty of economic policy,investor sentiment and overconfidence of fund managers.Specifically,when the uncertainty level of economic policy increases,investors usually choose to allocate lower risk assets and redeem riskier fund products;moreover,because of the higher investment risk,fund managers usually delay investment,so the uncertainty of economic policy plays a negative role.Because managers with high level of career concern understand the existence of disposal effect and know that investors’ risk tolerance will be enhanced under the condition of loss,and capital inflow is more sensitive to the relative return when investors are in high mood,fund managers will choose to increase the allocation proportion of high-risk assets in order to expand the scale under the background of the principal-agent problem.Therefore,investors’ mood plays a positive regulatory role.The overconfidence of fund managers will cause them to attribute poor performance to bad luck,so fund managers with high level of career concern will hope to reverse the performance ranking by raising the level of fund risk taking,so fund managers’ overconfidence plays a positive role in adjusting. |
