Research On Quality Cheating Behavior Management Of Chinese Hrebal Medicine Supply Chain Based On Evolutionary Game

Chinese herbal medicine is the material basis for the inheritance and development of traditional Chinese medicine,and is a strategic resource related to the national economy and people’s livelihood.As the raw material of Chinese patented medicines,Chinese herbal pieces,Chinese medicine food and related health products,the quality of Chinese herbal medicines is closely related to the lives and health.However,at present,the quality of Chinese herbal medicine is worrying,which has been one of the main reasons for unqualified medicines over the years.Quality cheating behaviors such as adulteration,staining and weight gain occurred frequently in the market of Chinese herbal medicine.How to prevent the quality cheating behaviors such as suppliers providing unqualified or lowpotency CHM,is essential to improve the quality of Chinese herbal medicine supply chain.In this study,the method of evolutionary game was used to establish a two-dimensional evolutionary game model and a four-dimensional evolutionary game model,which were composed of Chinese herbal medicine suppliers and manufacturers,respectively,aiming at the quality cheating behavior problems of suppliers.The model results are obtained through the analysis of stable strategy and evolution paths,and the influence of some decision parameters and exogenous variables such as the percentage of suppliers selected,rewards,punishments,and the cost of quality inspections on the evolutionary stable state was analyzed by numerical simulation experiments in the MATLAB software.The results are as follows: The model can evolve into an optimal state regardless of whether the efficacy of Chinese herbal medicine is considered: Manufacturers select the random inspection strategy,and suppliers provide Chinese herbal medicine with high quality;When manufacturers choose the random inspection strategy,the percentage of quality inspection of manufacturers to random inspection has a greater impact on the result of the stable strategy.Regardless of the evolution of any of the situations mentioned in the article,the quality of Chinese herbal medicine purchased can be improved by increasing the percentage of quality inspection;The improvement of rewards and punishments for suppliers of unqualified Chinese herbal medicine by manufacturers and the improvement of punishments for manufacturers by government regulatory authorities can make the evolution result change to the optimal state.That is,manufacturers and regulatory authorities can improve the quality of Chinese herbal medicine in the market by increasing the intensity of rewards and punishments.