Research On The Influence Of Manager Behavior On Corporate Financialization

Since the financial crisis,the financialization trend of the real economy has become more and more obvious,and more and more real enterprises have obtained financial benefits by investing financial assets.At the same time,managers have the right to allocate assets,and the existence of managers’ self-interested behavior and irrational behavior allows managers to make full use of their positions for their own interests,which in turn causes serious problems of corporate financialization.At the microeconomic level,the purpose of financial assets is to serve real assets.With the deepening of the degree of corporate financialization,this will not only lead to the weakening or even "hollowing" of the main activities of real enterprises,but also make China’s real economy appear "out of reality to virtual" phenomenon.Therefore,by studying the relationship between managers’ behavior and corporate financialization,this thesis finds an asset allocation scheme that is more conducive to the development of real enterprises.In addition,product market competition can reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers,improve the transparency of market information,and change the behavior of managers,which in turn will affect managers’ investment decisions on financial assets.The thesis combings the relevant literature research and defines the relevant concepts,in which the thesis is based on whether the interests of managers and owners are consistent,and collectively refers to the manager agency behavior and manager overconfidence as manager behavior.The thesis is based on theories such as short-sighted theory and product market competition theory,on the basis of studying the relationship between manager behavior and corporate financialization,this thesis introduces product market competition,studies the impact on the relationship between manager behavior and corporate financialization,and explores the difference in the regulating role of product market competition.The 2013-2021 data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in China is selected as research samples,variables are selected and models are constructed,and descriptive statistical analysis,correlation analysis,multicollinearity test and multiple regression analysis are performed on the data.In order to solve the endogenous problem of two-way causality between manager behavior and enterprise financialization,the explanatory variable lag is used to test the first stage,and the robustness test adopts the method of replacing variables and adjusting samples,and distinguishes the term of financial assets and the nature of property rights for heterogeneity analysis.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between manager behavior and corporate financialization,that is,manager agency behavior and manager overconfidence can promote corporate financialization.After the introduction of product market competition,it alleviates the corporate financialization caused by manager agency behavior,on the contrary,aggravates the corporate financialization caused by manager overconfidence.Based on the research conclusions,the thesis puts forward the following suggestions: reasonably allocate of financial assets to prevent the corporate financialization;establish executive incentives to discourage manager agency behavior;strengthen investment risk training and correct the psychological bias of overconfidence;establish a sound market competition mechanism to control the corporate financialization.The relevant research of the thesis has found a new direction for c to rationally allocate financial assets,which is conducive to enterprises to formulate more scientific financial asset allocation plans.And the thesis has found a feasible way for managing China’s economy to "turn from reality to reality",and actively guide China’s economy to "get rid of reality to reality".