An Empirical Study On The Effect Of Major Shareholder’s Equity Pledge On Enterprise Innovation Efficiency

The report of the 20 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that innovation is at the core of China’s modernization construction and is the strategic support for the high-quality development of China’s economy.However,due to the long investment cycle and the characteristics of "long-term slow release",innovation often presents a situation of insufficient investment.As an efficient financing method,equity pledge effectively alleviates the problem of financing difficulties for major shareholders of listed companies,and also finds new financing channels for the capital investment of enterprise innovation.However,after pledging the equity of major shareholders,they often face various risks such as "transfer of control" and "hollowing out",which affect investors’ decision-making and then affect the innovation efficiency of enterprises.Therefore,under the background that innovation is extremely important and equity pledge is very common,studying the impact of equity pledge of major shareholders on the innovation efficiency of enterprises and its mechanism has important theoretical and practical significance for the national strategic layer and enterprise management level.This thesis uses literature research,comparative analysis,and empirical research methods to construct a mediation effect model and a moderated mediation effect model based on dynamic panel data to explore the path and mechanism of the impact of large shareholder equity pledge on enterprise innovation efficiency.Firstly,the thesis reviews relevant literature and theoretical concepts at home and abroad,and proposes research ideas based on the research gaps identified and the current problems of enterprises;Then,the system GMM estimation method is used to verify the multiple linear regression equation,exploring the impact of major shareholder equity pledge on enterprise innovation efficiency,as well as the intermediary and regulatory role played by managers’ risk preference and executive equity incentive throughout the process;Finally,based on the empirical results,corresponding recommendations are proposed.The results show that:(1)the pledge of equity of major shareholders significantly reduces the innovation efficiency of enterprises,and the inhibitory effect increases with the increase of pledge degree and pledge ratio;(2)The equity pledge of major shareholders reduces the efficiency of enterprise innovation by suppressing the risk appetite of management,and the risk appetite of managers plays an intermediary effect in this process;(3)Under other conditions being equal,the equity incentive of executives plays a negative role in regulating the intermediary effect of managers’ risk appetite,and the equity incentive of senior executives alleviates the negative impact of equity pledge of major shareholders on the innovation efficiency of enterprises;(4)Whether it is a state-owned enterprise or a private enterprise,the equity pledge of the major shareholder significantly inhibits the innovation efficiency of the enterprise,and the inhibitory effect of state-owned enterprises on the innovation efficiency of enterprises is stronger than that of private enterprises.This study not only enriches the theoretical research on equity pledge and enterprise innovation efficiency,but also strives to increase the attention of all parties to the improvement of the innovation ability of pledge-based enterprises through empirical analysis.It provides new and beneficial ideas for improving the efficiency of enterprise innovation,government supervision and investor capital investment.