State-owned Capital Operating Budget,Cash Dividends And Agency Costs

The establishment of state capital management budget system is an inevitable choice under the socialist financial framework with Chinese characteristics.Under the system implementatio n,it not only accelerates the reform and innovation of state-owned enterprises,but also clarifies the responsibility and function of state-owned economy,which lays the foundation for our economic development and the construction of new development patte rn.However,there are still many problems in the reform of state-owned enterprises,especially the inefficient investment of enterprises.The reason is that the state-owned capital operation budget system is not perfect,and the agents of state-owned enterprises still have more free cash flow and thus adopt excessive investment behavior.Therefore,this paper takes the state-owned capital operation budget system to reduce the free cash flow of state-owned enterprises as the starting point to study the role of the system on the agency cost of state-owned enterprises.In the context of the reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper puts the state-owned capital operating budget system,cash dividends and agency costs into an overall analysis model,in order to verify whether the implementation of the system can reduce the agency costs of state-owned enterprises,and if there is a suppression effect,whether it can be transmitted through the intermediate variable of cash dividends,to further explore the inte rnal logic of the implementation of the system and agency costs.In this paper,state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises from 2011 to 2021 are selected as the experimental group and the control group respectively.On this basis,the differen ce model and the intermediary model are used to analyze the influence of Chinese government on its agency costs before and after the implementation of policies,and the relationship between variables is gradually verified according to the intermediary effe ct.The research shows that:(1)The implementation of the state capital operation budget system is significantly negatively correlated with the agency cost of state owned enterprises,which indicates that the implementation of the system can reduce the ag ency cost of state owned enterprises and play a certain role in the governance of the "insider" control problems existing in state owned enterprises.(2)According to the different economic development conditions of the regions where state-owned enterprises are located,the analysis of sub-sample data shows that the higher the regional marketization level,the weaker the effect of institutional implementation on reducing agency costs.(3)There is a significant positive correlation between the implementation of the system and cash dividends,indicating to some extent that the implementation of the system improves the cash dividend of state-owned enterprises and plays a positive role in reducing the free cash flow of state-owned enterprises.(4)According to different regional economic development conditions of state-owned enterprises,sub-sample data analysis is conducted,and it is found that the higher the regional marketization level,the more obvious the suppression effect of institutional implementation on the proportion of cash dividend extraction.(5)In general,cash dividends play a partial intermediary role in the relationship between institutional implementation and agency costs.In low marketization areas,cash dividends do not play an intermediary rol e in the relationship between institutional implementation and agency costs.In areas with high marketization level,cash dividends play a partial intermediary role in the relationship between institutional implementation and agency costs.(6)For local state-owned enterprises,the effect of system implementation on reducing agency costs will be more prominent in central state-owned enterprises;For central state-owned enterprises,the intermediary role of cash dividends will be more prominent in local state-owned enterprises.(7)If an enterprise is in a highly competitive industry,cash dividends play an intermediary role between the state capital operating budget system and agency costs;However,if an enterprise is in a low-competition industry,there is no intermediary effect between cash dividends and agency costs.This paper takes the state-owned capital operation budget system as the research object,focuses on the implementation effect o f the system,studies the relationship between the implementation of the system and the agency cost,verifies that cash dividends play an intermediary role in the implementation of the system to reduce the agency cost,and compares the effect implementation difference of state-owned enterprises in regions with different economic development levels.It is beneficial to the perfection of the system,so as to improve the level of cash dividend payment,reduce the agency cost,and realize the idea of sharing the profits of state-owned enterprises.