Berkeley on common sense, theology, and matter

In this dissertation, I examine the relationship between Berkeley's theology, his theory of common sense, and the structure of his argument for immaterialism. I begin by arguing that to possess common sense, according to Berkeley, is to use the faculties of the mind in the right way, and I reconstruct Berkeley's theory of the proper functioning and use of the cognitive faculties of the mind, drawing chiefly on Berkeley's Notebooks and Alciphron. I then show that this account of the mind, i.e. Berkeley's account of common sense, is theologically inflected. It depends crucially on Berkeley's theological commitments: his conception of postlapsarian human nature, his soteriology, and views on the attributes of God. I suggest that Berkeley's views on common sense underwrite his arguments for immaterialism. The most straightforward arguments for Berkeleian immaterialism presuppose the account of the nature of the mind that Berkeley develops in his Notebooks and Alciphron.;In the last chapter of the dissertation, I show that Berkeley's demonstrations of immaterialism in his early metaphysical and epistemological works, the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, rely either on a particular conception of the Christian duty of charity or on his views on common sense. Since I have already shown that Berkeley's conception of common sense is theologically inflected, I conclude that immaterialism is, at bottom, a theological position, and go on to explore the implications of this conclusion for our understanding of Berkeley's place in the history of philosophy and of the nature of his philosophical thought.