Fideism and Wittgenstein's ethic of perspicuity

"Wittgensteinian fideism" is an expression Kai Nielsen coined to classify a group of approaches in philosophy of religion he understands to immunize religious beliefs from critique by emphasizing their rational autonomy. For better or worse, Nielsen's characterization of Wittgenstein's import for philosophy of religion has been very influential. This dissertation challenges the "fideistic" interpretation of Wittgenstein in philosophy of religion and suggests ways to read Wittgenstein on religion that are better connected with his philosophical corpus and biography.;Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, the first part of the dissertation traces historically the use of the term "fideism" from its origins in nineteenth century theology to its current philosophical and theological uses. This historical study reveals there to be not one but several uses or "traditions" of fideism. I argue that uncritical use of the term can compound interpretive misunderstanding, so "fideism" is helpful in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word.;The second part of the dissertation examines sources available for studying Wittgenstein's views on religion. Some of these texts such as private diaries and correspondence were never intended for publication. Yet these important but problematic texts should be read against central themes of the texts Wittgenstein prepared for publication. One such central theme is Wittgenstein's ethic of perspicuity, or his duty to search out clarity for its own sake. This ethic guides my readings of Wittgenstein's corpus and is itself the subject of the final chapter.;The last part of the dissertation traces the reception of Wittgenstein in twentieth century philosophy of religion. The debate over the "fideistic" classification of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion itself developed amidst problems in the philosophy of language posed earlier in the century by logical positivists to the meaningfulness of religious language. My contention is that this positivist background skewed the classification and understanding of Wittgenstein's views. The idea that language is fundamentally social in nature, a central theme that emerged in Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, supports neither this emotivist/expressivist line nor the epistemic isolationism and "quietism" characteristic of "Wittgensteinian fideism."...