Meaning and morality

Our ability to use language meaningfully derives in large part from our status as moral agents. The role of value and normativity cannot be separated from meaning and language use.;Paul Grice's seminal work on implicature introduces the intuitive distinction between what is said and what is meant. What is implicated is supposed to fill this gap. As has been previously noted, Grice's theory relies heavily on unexplicated notions of rationality, cooperation, and intentions. This dissertation seeks to explore these notions, grounding them in a theory of moral psychology, and then examining what modifications to the theory of implicature are then needed.;I begin with a review of suggestive, but unsystematic remarks left by Grice on psychology and ethics. From these comments, I construct a novel, quasi-Gricean theory of moral psychology I call Rational Virtue Theory, which is an egoistic moral psychology that falls under the rubric of virtue ethics, given its emphasis on eudaimonia (or happiness). This theory posits various End Selection Rules and Behavioral Principles. End Selection Rules are designed to guide one in constructing one's goals for life in pursuit of eudaimonia. Behavioral Principles are ceteris paribus strategies for action capable of repetition and replication, and which are stable and rational.;With this theory of moral psychology, I take on the issue of cooperation, first arguing for its status as a behavioral principle. Cooperation in language use, however, I contend is distinct from cooperation in general. I then argue that there are two distinct notions of cooperation in language use: conversational cooperation and communicative cooperation. Though Grice appears to endorse the former, I assert that the latter is the actual source of Grice's conversational maxims and necessary for implicature and successful communication. Next, I argue for a variety of modifications to the theory of implicature, including allowing for moral implicatures and the role of moral maxims in working out what a speaker has implicated. As it turns out, the gap between what is said and what is meant is much larger than Grice initially conceived of, and understanding the role of rationality and normativity in language use helps fill in more of that gap.