Research On The Effect Of Government Subsidy Strategies On The Decision-making Of Green Supply Chain

Green sustainable development has become the focus of attention from all walks of life.However,constrained by many factors such as R&D funds and technical capacity,it is necessary for the government to formulate a reasonable subsidy policy for the stimulation of the enterprises in improving their level of green production research and development.Combining the development of green supply chain management,considering the exclusiveness and symbiosis of government subsidy strategies,this dissertation adds three subsidy strategies in terms of green degree,production cost and R&D investment into game model,and studies the influence of different government subsidy strategies on enterprise green decision-making in green supply chain from the perspectives of enterprise performance,social welfare and subsidized expenditure.This dissertation is intended to provide some suggestions for the sustainable development of China’s green industry and the reasonable formulation and implementation of subsidy policies.The main research work is as follows:(1)It explores the influence of government subsidy strategies on short-term decisionmaking of enterprises.Considering the level of green preference and R&D investment,a static model of green supply chain is constructed,which takes product green degree,enterprise profit and input-output indicators as evaluation criteria of government subsidy strategy.The strategies with best subsidy effect are R&D investment subsidy strategy,production cost subsidy strategy and green subsidy strategy,respectively.(2)It explores the influence of government subsidy strategies on long-term decisionmaking of enterprises.Combined with continuous-time model and discrete-time model,the influence research and complexity analysis of long-term decision-making of enterprises in dynamic supply chain are given respectively.Considering the attenuation effect of green degree of products,it shows that the steady-state index rankings of green decision corresponding to different subsidy strategies are time-invariant,while the dynamic index ranking in the evolution trajectory changes with time.The time-varying ranking determines the best selection path of subsidy strategies in the complete period.Considering the decision-making bias of enterprises,it shows that if the decision deviation of any enterprise is large,chaos will appear in the supply chain system.Increasing government subsidy expenditure is the motivation to control chaos and restore system stability.(3)The impact of symbiotic subsidy strategy on firms’ green decisions is explored.A multi-objective game model with simultaneous optimization of social welfare and subsidy expenditure is developed for the policy reality that the government packages and implements multiple subsidy strategies.NSGA-Ⅱ is used to derive the Pareto solution set,and then discusses the impact of factors such as the difficulty of policy implementation and the upper limit of subsidy spending on the choice of subsidy strategy portfolios.It is found that the government’s fiscal capacity determines the number of policy portfolios as well as their structural weight.When the government is financially well-off,the implementation of a portfolio of subsidies is conducive to improving social welfare and reducing product prices.In times of fiscal constraint,the implementation of individual subsidy strategy is conducive to controlling subsidy expenditures,but leads to higher product prices.(4)The impact of subsidy strategy considering peer incentives on green decision making is explored.Considering the reality of local financial constraints,the evolutionary game model of enterprise R&D and government subsidies under peer incentives is established.Combining the two subsidy mechanisms of static and dynamic incentives,the stability of local equilibrium is analyzed,and the effects of peer incentive funds,subsidy coefficients,and R&D investment levels on the evolutionary path of the group are explored to verify the feasibility of peer incentives at the cooperative mechanism level: lower government subsidy expenditures can still motivate manufacturers to green R&D;while higher government subsidy spending may lead to subsidy trap.The dynamically adjusted peer incentive mechanism can manage the unstable cooperative relationship between government and enterprises.