Research On The Manufacturer’s Green Process Innovation And Green Product Innovation Strategies In Green Supply Chain

In today’s world,green technology and green product are vigorously promoted.If China wants to remain invincible in international competition,it must carry out in-depth research and development in green innovation and provide a new way for green economic transformation and high-quality development.The green innovation activities of enterprises are of great significance and value to the overall development level of the green supply chain,to improve the strength and competitiveness of enterprises,to realize the sustainable development of the supply chain and to improve the increasingly serious environmental problems.Therefore,in order to rationally allocate scarce resources,maximize the effectiveness of green innovation,realize economic benefits and improve the environment problems,this dissertation,based on two key innovation behaviors in innovation activities,studies the problem of the manufacturer’s decision-making on green process innovation strategy,R&D cooperation level and green product innovation strategy in the green supply chain environment of competition,cooperation or co-opetition.The main research contents and conclusion are summarized as follows:Firstly,in the environment of competitive green supply chain,this dissertation studies a retailer facing an upstream(manufacturer)while implementing green process innovation and facing another competitor(retailer)in the same industry.How the downstream competition affects the manufacturer’s green process innovation strategy?And how the retailer decides its pricing strategy and advertising strategy to gain an advantage in the same industry competition?This dissertation considers a dynamic supply chain environment consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers.This problem describes as a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailers and a Nash game between the two retailers.In particular,the green process innovation is measured by the manufacturer’s effort level of green process innovation investment.A certain green innovation technology applied in the process innovation is described by a dynamic process,and the optimal operation and marketing strategies of supply chain members is solved by the Dynamic Programming Principle and numerical method.Through the analysis and discussion of analytical solutions and numerical simulations,it is concluded that green process innovation is the optimal strategy for the manufacturer in the long-term operation.The strategy of the manufacturer about green process innovation is influenced by different strategies of different retailers and different market conditions.However,the manufacturer will obtain more benefit if the retailer with low advertising influence in the same industry occupies the main market.The retailer with an inferior advertising influence will gain a competitive advantage in the same industry if its initial market share is not at an extremely low level.Secondly,in the cooperative supply chain environment,the downstream retailer also acts as a decision-maker of the green product innovation strategy.The dissertation studies how the cost-sharing contracts with different cooperation levels between the downstream retailer and the upstream manufacturer affects the decision-making of green product innovation strategy and pricing strategy.The dissertation considers a two-stage supply chain which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer.One case is that the manufacturer or the retailer is the decision-maker to decides the green product innovation strategy when the cost sharing ratio is an exogenous variable.Another case is that the manufacturer and the retailer jointly decide the cost sharing ratio by way of bargaining,where the manufacturer or the retailer as the strategic leader decides the strategy of green product innovation.The model is solved by backward induction,and is further analyzed through the analytical solutions and numerical simulations.The conclusion shows that if the proportion of sharing is exogenous,the member who is the decision-maker of green product innovation strategy will make a higher innovation effort strategy if it bears a lower proportion of innovation cost.If the sharing ratio is endogenous,the decision-maker of innovation strategy has the best green product innovation strategy if the maker has higher bargaining power and bears lower innovation cost.In particular,the improvement of cooperation between supply chain members weakens the absolute advantage of the manufacturer or the retailer who dominates the innovation strategy and narrows the differences of green product innovation strategy,pricing strategy and the profits of members between the cases of the manufacturer leading innovation and the retailer leading innovation.And the improvement of the cooperation level can make supply chain more harmonious.In addition,the level of cooperation will also affect the emergence of a win-win result for the manufacturer and the retailer.If the level of cooperation is low,there will not be a win-win situation between the manufacturer and the retailer.On the contrary,if the level of cooperation is high,there will be a win-win result,and the win-win area is only influenced by the effects of green product innovation on the unit cost of production and on the market demand.Finally,in the environment of co-opetition supply chain,the dissertation studies how the green product innovation strategy influences the entry strategy of the upstream supplier,and how the downstream uses the green product innovation strategy to compete with the upstream who enters the market.In particular,the spillover effect of innovation and the encroachment of the outsourced supplier are considered in this dissertation,that is,the imitation level of the outsourced supplier is described in the model.Two situations are analyzed.One is that the manufacturer decides the green product innovation strategy when the outsourced supplier does not enter the market but only produces the core components for the manufacturer.The other one is that the supplier decides the wholesale price strategy and the manufacturer decide on the green product innovation strategy to compete with the supplier when the supplier enters the market.Through solving the model by backward induction and analyzing the analytical solutions and numerical simulations,it is concluded that the supplier enters the market at the expense of the manufacturer in most cases.Interestingly,it will be a win-win situation for both the supplier and the manufacturer if the supplier invades when the level of imitation is low and most consumers prefer the copycat with low price.Green product innovation can be used as a tool to prevent the encroachment by the copycat,and it can improve the features and the effects of environmental protection of its product.If the imitation capability of the supplier is at a higher level,the less likely the supplier is to encroaches the market.In addition,this dissertation extends the main model to study an extended supplementary,which takes the unit production cost of the supplier into consideration.The results of the extended model show that the above conclusions and managerial insights are still valid,and verify the robustness of the main model.