The Analysis Of The Enterprise's Environmental Information Disclosure Behavior Based On The Evolutionary Game Theory

Since the industrial revolution happened in 18th century, the social productivity has been greatly improved, and the human society gets lots of benefits from industrial revolution. But at the same time, large scale of industrial production results in serious environmental pollution problems. As the main body of the industrial production, the environmental problems are relevant to the enterprises'production. So, people paid more and more attention to the enterprise's environmental behavior. The success of the traditional environmental management depends on control of the environmental information of the enterprises by the government. Since May 1st 2008, the method of environmental information disclosure has been issued and performed by the government; this new regulation offered a new method of environmental control to the government. This paper is on the assumption of bounded rationality of the enterprise, based on the evolutionary game theory; we will firstly analyze the driving factors of the behavior of environmental information disclosure and supervise of the environmental information of the company. Secondly, we will use the replicator dynamic equation to explain the evolution of the environmental information disclosure behavior of the company and the supervision of the information by the government. We will get the possible influence for the two evolutionary processes by the environmental information management institution and make some policy propose.