A Study On Government Regulation Of China's Trans-boundary Water Pollution In Basin

In recent years, trans-boundary water pollution in basin frequently occurs in China, which has caused widespread concern in society. Trans-boundary water pollution in basin not only affects economic development of the related local government and the safety of people's life in the basin, seriously, it also leads to the interest conflicts between local governments, which greatly damage the social harmony. Strengthening the government regulation of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin is becoming a major historical issue faced by the government in China.Viewing the actuality of the trans-boundary water pollution in China, the paper has completed deep-seated study on the trans-boundary water pollution accidents in basin occurred frequently, using the new theory of Regulation Economics, combining the theory of Governance embedded in the governance mode of promotion incentives and fiscal decentralization. This paper not only analyzes the connotation and character of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin, but also, it try to innovate in the method of study during building a model about the regulation of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin using the game theory related. After studying the status of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin, we find that there are many problems to be solved in the regulation policies adopted now. More importantly, this paper analyses the negative impact with Chinese style decentralization embedded the governance mode of the Chinese government in trans-boundary water pollution in basin, which constitutes the main reason of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin. And the reasons mainly perform in the following four aspects: (1) The unclear definition of property rights of water resources in basin; (2) The government in the upstream lacks of the motivation of environment regulation. (3) The local government has a shortage of environment regulation incentives; (4) The impact of local protectionism.Viewing the character of"Asymmetric externalities"in the trans-boundary water pollution in basin, combining the governance mode of promotion incentives and fiscal decentralization, this paper analyzes the deep-seated reasons of trans-boundary water pollution in basin. Then, we propose the effective suggestions strengthening the government regulation of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin aiming the deep-seated reasons: (1) Improve the legal system; (2) Set up the authoritative regulatory agencies in basin; (3) Straighten out the powers and responsibilities of regulation in basin; (4) Improve the supervision mechanism in basin; (5) Form an effective mechanism for ecological compensation.There are several probable innovations in this thesis:1. This thesis makes a systemic study about the trans-boundary water pollution in basin using the hot theory of Chinese style Decentralization. It is a hot issue to make a study about the study the environment regulation embedded in the governance mode of promotion incentives and fiscal decentralization. But until now, there is little literature involves the environment regulation of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin using the theory of Chinese style Decentralization. This thesis is a supplement.2. The thesis tries to innovate in the method of study during building a model about the regulation of the trans-boundary water pollution in basin using the game theory related, to analyze the strategic behaviors of the local government in basin. The game model explains that with the implementation of the effective government regulation, coordination and cooperation between the local government can realize maximizing the overall interests in basin. Conversely, it will lead to the deterioration of water environment in basin.3. The thesis tries to make a forward-looking study to the regulatory agencies and the configuration of power and responsibility in basin, using the new theory of Regulation Economics. The regulatory power in China is so dispersive that it shows a state of fragmentation. The lack of coordination in regulatory department leads to the inefficient in the trans-boundary water pollution in basin. Then, this thesis proposes corresponding suggestion to solve the problem.