Study On The Governance Of Trans-boundary Water Pollution Based On Inter-governmental Relationship

The advancement of China’s industrialization and urbanization has led to an increase in cross-border water pollution disputes.The relationship between the upper and lower reaches of the government has become increasingly tense.Winning the battle against cross-border water pollution has become a major project in the construction of ecological civilization.The water pollution control in the Minjiang River Basin plays an important role in the transformation of the green development mode of Fujian Province and the creation of a livable environment.However,under the current “fragmentation” governance model,it is difficult to achieve the concept of ecological synergy between the governments,and the governance method is relatively simple,and the significant effect of governance is difficult to improve.Therefore,in order to maintain the integrity of the basin,it is urgent to reform the traditional environmental management system,strengthen the horizontal coordination and unification between governments under the control of higher level governments,and actively encourage enterprises,the public and other diversified subjects to participate in the management of trans-boundary water pollution,so as to form an ecological co-governance pattern.From the perspective of inter-governmental relations research,this paper summarizes the related research on transboundary water pollution control at home and abroad,and provides theoretical guidance for the research of this paper by applying the collaborative governance theory,public goods theory and other basic theories.At the same time,based on the existing research,this paper innovatively constructs an evolutionary game model of four situations of local government segmentation governance and collaborative governance under the control of no provincial(municipal)level government and provincial(municipal)level government.Through the corresponding replication dynamic differential equations,the evolution equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of local governments in the basin are solved,and further analyzes the influence of relevant parameter changes on the position of saddle points,so as to grasp the behavior evolution law between local governments in the basin and master the factors affecting the evolution of local government behavior in the basin.The study believes that the river basin management system will influence the choice of local government behavior strategies.In addition,in order to achieve coordinated governance,the provincial(municipal)level government regulation should be strengthened,such as promoting the government performance appraisal system and the financial system reform.Of course,in order to reduce the negative external effects of water pollution,we should also give full play to market-based means and pay attention to the participation of the public.In order to investigate the influence of local government governance strategy choices on the self-utility and the overall social welfare of the river basin in the above four game models,this study compares the effectiveness of government game behavior with the two criteria of efficiency and fairness.It believes that provincial(municipal)government regulation and cross-border water pollution governance together,the two parties are most likely to obtain maximum utility,and the overall social welfare will also be maximized,and ultimately achieve the unity of efficiency and fairness.On this basis,by expounding the practice of trans-boundary water pollution control in the Minjiang River Basin,the paper analyzes the dilemma of the government in the process of pollution control and the mechanism of dilemma formation.Combined with the practical experience of relevant governance at home and abroad,this paper puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions,including legal system,institutional guarantee,collaborative governance system and industrial structure,in order to provide beneficial references for improving the inter-governmental collaborative governance system and improving governance capacity,and effectively solving the problem of transboundary water pollution governance in the Minjiang River Basin.