.1958-1969 Years Analysis Of The French Policy

The dissertation bases on declassified documents of Foreign Relations of the United States, and offers a reinterpretation of transatlantic and especially US-France relations throughout the decisive 1958 to 1969 period. The essence of American policy towards France is that US intends to shorten divergence with France on NATO strategy direction and leadership. The year of 1958 was a turning point. De Gaulle got power again. His policy from its inception represented a challenge for the United States, a challenge that went to the heart of US conception of its own power, of course its Atlantic leadership. So American presidents began to consult with De Gaulle on dollar crisis, nuclear sharing, instituting tripartite organization. As for US, faced with what might be called the Gaullist grand design, while maintaining at first only a reactive attitude, it gradually learned how to take measure of this challenge. While still seeking to keep French policy from affecting the rest of the Alliance, it eventually adopted a more dynamic and constructive approach .New light thus can be shed on the US-French relation that took shape in this period.The dissertation includes three sections as follow: Preface: mainly narrates the article's present situation of academic research on this topic and practical significance.Body: explores the regulation and evolution of American government 's France policy.Section one briefly introduces the past policy throughout 1945 to 1958, and analyses background US faced with in 1958. At that time mainly related to interim aid to France in late 1947 and conflict of Algeria decolonization. But in 1958 many new situation appears, such as mitigation of two superpowers, European Economic Community, American payment huge deficit and gold outflow, De Gaulle 's grandeur and independence policy execution.Section two details adjustment of American policy from three dimensions, As for economic dimension, American strengthened economic permeation to France. Because American international payment deficit got worse, American government began to stop any aiding to France, and prevented to French dollar attack. In international currency reform field, American succeeded resisting French attack.As for nuclear force dimension, American refused to supply technical assistance about nuclear weapon production, except for some raw material with some condition. Then American carried out MLF Plan (Multilateral Force) to solve the problem of atomic responsibilities with France. But De Gaulle would not compromise over nuclear independence, so the MLF at this stage was already failing. As for defense dimension, American objected to formulating tripartite proposal. At first it is a polite but blunt refusal, then it fell into stalemate. But the progress of disengagement continued, and in parallel, the Americans intensified political and military preparations to cope with the French withdrawal. Washington attributed to the French concern to avoid a confrontation with the United States. The US approach to the French problem remained as a whole fundamentally conservative and aimed at making possible French withdrawal have the least possible impact on NATO efficacy and cohesion.Section Three is about qualitative analysis and significance of American policy to French. Its character is that American activity embodied passive. Contradiction of two countries is not intrinsic. And through international organization and coordinating Alliance relations American pressured French.Conclusion evaluates the American policy to French, and illustrates the specific nature of American-French relationship.