Levels,Constitution,and Causation In Mechanisms

If different scientific theories describe our world at different levels,then the question is how we should understand the status of high-level sciences and their relationship with low-level sciences,especially in consideration of the fact that inter-theoretical reduction has been subjected to severe criticisms.The problem of explanatory(causal)relevance in high-level sciences would become more serious,considering the following claim that physical world is causally closed.However,the crux of this problem,in the view of the so-called 'new mechanistic philosophy',is that it presupposes a wrong understanding of scientific explanation and causation.New mechanistic philosophers believe that mechanistic explanation provides a more plausible conception of explanation and causation in special sciences.Compared with regularity theory of causation and explanation,mechanistic explanation better reflects real scientific practices in special sciences,and provides a better way to integrate scientific theories at different levels.The object of this paper is to handle those classic metaphysical problems concerning levels,constitution,and causation with the help of a new mechanistic framework.In Section 2,I argue that mechanisms can facilitate our understanding of the concept of'level',since mechanistic explanations are intrinsically multi-level.Besides,there is an explanatory relationship between high-levels and low-levels in mechanisms in virtue of constitutive relevance between components and phenomena.In Section 3,I attempt to give a critical discussion of Craver's mutual manipulation account of constitutive relevance.I argue that constitutive relevance itself is not causal,but it is a combination of causation and supervenience.In Section 4,I demonstrate that there is proportionality in mechanisms.Furthermore,lower-level causation should be taken to be singular and productive causal processes,while high-level causation should be taken to be general and difference-making causal relevance.However,even if these two kinds of causation are different,they are interdependent,either ontologically,epistemologically,or practically.In brief,high-level sciences are distinct from but dependent on low-level sciences,and they can be integrated and unified to explain the same set of phenomena.Admittedly,a mechanistic conception of scientific explanation and causation could not solve all the problems yet.However,as we might have been able to conclude from existing discussions,new mechanistic philosophy at least provides a novel approach to these problems,and thus is worthy of further considering.