The Behavioral Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Grouped Bid Evaluation In Reverse Auction Based On Prospect Theory

Reverse auctions,also known as centralized procurement,are widely used by governments and large enterprises for their low cost and high efficiency.The selection of winners requires a systematic bid evaluation process.In general,during this process,bid attributes are divided into technical attributes and business attributes,and bid evaluation experts are divided into technical experts and business experts.It is difficult for the experts to accurately get all the information of bid documents within a limited time due to the negative correlation between the two groups of attributes,the differences in evaluation priorities and the complexity of bid evaluation environment.Their historical experience,personal interest may have impact on decision-making which cause deviating scoring and bid evaluation unfairness.Therefore,we consider the risk preference and loss aversion of bid evaluation participants under complex environment.Grouped bid evaluation behaviors will be analyzed based on evolutionary game theory(EGT)and prospect theory(PT).First,we make a literature review of current studies,summarizes the latest research in bid evaluation,and find our research point.Considering the influence of personal cognitive,risk preference and other psychological characteristics on decision-making,based on EGT and PT,we establish a two party evolutionary game model for the experts and supervision department and find evolutionary stable strategies(ESSs).Numerical simulation is developed on MATLAB GUI platform to verify the rationality of the model and compare with the one that does not consider PT under the same notation settings.Then,considering antagonism between two groups of expert,we expand a tripartite evolutionary game model which contains technical experts,business experts and supervision departments,try to find the influence of attributes on strategy selection.Numerical simulation is also developed to explore the behavioral evolution path of each participant.Finally,in order to guide the experts choose cooperation strategy,we analyze the impact of incentives on uncooperative experts' strategies and give the applicable conditions.The results show that the two-party evolutionary game model can reach ESSs,that is,the expert choose cooperation strategy and the department choose supervision strategy.However,the strategy selection of each participants has strong correlation in tripartite game model.Although it is difficult to reach ESS,it can achieve local stability through notation adjustments.Incentive strategy has diverse effects on the experts with different risk preferences.This study concludes the factors that affect strategy selection of bid evaluation participants,condenses the problem in grouped bid evaluation,and analyze the optimization strategy in bid evaluation management from different aspects.