An Imperfect Information Game Model Between Local Government And Relevant Interest Groups In Environmental Pollution Group Incident

With the continuous development of China's economy and society,more and more large-scale projects are in full swing,but in reality,many large-scale construction projects may cause environmental pollution,causing serious interference to the surrounding residents,which also causes environmental pollution mass incidents from time to time.The stakeholders involved in group incidents caused by environmental pollution mainly include local governments,surrounding people and polluting enterprises.Because of the inconsistency of interests and information among the three parties in reality,the group incidents of environmental pollution also present a complicated trend.The relevant behavior decisions of interest groups also affect the further development of group incidents.This paper tries to reveal the optimal decision-making mechanism of different interest groups in the case of large amount of information asymmetry from the perspective of the game of "local government-surrounding residents" and "local government-polluting enterprises" of environmental pollution group events,so as to provide policy reference for local governments to properly handle environmental pollution group events.This paper analyses the behavioral decision-making of the relevant interest groups(i.e.neighboring residents,polluting enterprises and local governments)in mass incidents caused by environmental pollution projects under asymmetric information.Firstly,the simultaneous game and sequential game models under incomplete information between local governments and neighboring residents are constructed,and the different emergency strategies of local governments are compared and analyzed.Secondly,it constructs the optimal decision-making model under the circumjacent residentsinformation search behavior,and analyses the influence of government subsidy and covert operation on the strategy selection under the circumjacent residents' information search ability.Thirdly,it constructs the incomplete information signal game model between local government and pollution project enterprises.The game between government and enterprise and market equilibrium in the process of approval of environmental pollution projects are discussed.The specific research work includes the following aspects:Firstly,based on Nikoofal's and Zhuang's optimization models for dealing with terrorist attacks and other related literature research,aiming at the qualitative characteristics of mass emergencies in China,which belong to contradictions among the people and are dominated by economic interests,this paper constructs an optimization model for the protesting masses and local governments,and analyses the places under incomplete information.The government adopts the open and confidential policy under the project expectation loss and subsidy and maintenance cost budget allocation difference.Secondly,on the basis of Xu's and Zhuang's relevant literature,combined with the behavior characteristics of neighboring residents in environmental pollution mass incidents in China,under incomplete information,the decision-making optimization model of neighboring residents with information search behavior is constructed,the optimal strategy set and the benefits under different strategies are discussed,and the government subsidies are further analyzed.The influence of horizontal and dark box operation level on different residents' choice of strategies.Thirdly,using the theory of incomplete information signal game,this paper abstracts the behavior choice of government and enterprises in the approval of pollution projects into a signal game model and carries out market equilibrium analysis.It studies the relationship between disguise cost,risk probability and government misjudgement cost of different enterprises,and leads to the blog of enterprises and governments.There are different types and efficiency equilibrium types.Finally,the government information search cost function is introduced to consider the impact of government information search on the final decision-making of enterprises and the overall market equilibrium.The innovations of this paper include the following aspects:Firstly,this paper will study the difference of expected loss,subsidy and cost budget allocation of government projects in different situations from the perspective of government's open and confidential policies.At the same time,it will consider the comparison of the first-mover advantages of different government emergency strategies under complete and incomplete information,which will be more conducive to the numerical analysis under different government strategies.It also makes the influence factors clearer and clearer.Secondly,this paper will consider the strategy choice of the surrounding residents in the specific situation of information search behavior under incomplete information,and analyze the influence of the level of government covert operation and subsidy on the strategy choice of the surrounding residents.This makes the behavior choices of residents around the world more realistic,and the factors affecting strategic choices are more comprehensive.Thirdly,this paper will discuss the market equilibrium of government-enterprise approval of pollution projects based on signal game model.Analysis and process of government and enterprises around the early approval of pollution project reporting game behavior,and the introduction of government information search cost function,consider the government information search and punishment mechanism declaration decision and influence the market equilibrium of the project,the influence factors of market equilibrium,more comprehensive.