A Study On Corporates' Behavior And Emission Reduction Coordination In Supply Chain Under Carbon Emission Reduction Policy

With the gradual deterioration of the climate,all social circles realize that the excessive emission of carbon dioxide is the main cause of climate problems.In order to protect the environment,the government began to regulate the carbon emissions of enterprises,and consumers' low-carbon preferences began to gradually increase.Faced with this situation,reducing carbon emissions has become a factor that must be considered in the operation of enterprises.Therefore,this paper studies the corporates' behavior and emission reduction coordination in supply chain under the carbon emission reduction policy,and provides some theoretical support and practical reference for supply chain emission reduction.Firstly,we study the emission reduction behavior choice of the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain under the supervision of the government.Considering the "free-rider" situation in low carbon production,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of low carbon technology production for upstream and downstream enterprises under government supervision.The evolutionary stable states under different conditions are obtained by calculation and analyzed.The analysis shows that the government's subsidies and penalties,as well as the profit of upstream and downstream enterprises when they adopt low-carbon technology,have a great impact on the results of the game.We can obtain the conditions under which the government should formulate emission reduction policies and the upstream and downstream enterprises choose emission reduction behavior.It can finally achieve the common development of economy,society and environment.Secondly,we consider the coordination of single-cycle emission reduction in supply chain under the consumer's low-carbon preference and carbon trading policy.In a two-level supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer,the retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity,and the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the order quantity of the retailer.Four scenarios are discussed: non-emission reduction,decentralized decision-making,centralized decision-making and cost-sharing contract provided by retailer.By comparing and analyzing the above four scenarios,we find that the supply chain coordination can be achieved by the retailer providing emission reduction cost sharing contract,and achieved Pareto improvement.In addition,we use the Rubenstein bargaining model to determine the cost sharing rate.Finally,an example is given to verify the impact of the cost-sharing ratio of emission reduction on emission reduction and profits,and to analyze the impact of consumers' low-carbon preference and government carbon trading policy on profits.Finally,the above-mentioned problem is extended to the long-term dynamic situation,and we study the emission reduction coordination problem of one supplier and two competing manufacturers.Considering consumers' low carbon preference and carbon trading policy,this paper studies the dynamic coordination of supply chain emission reduction.The differential game model is established in two scenarios: non-emission reduction contract and providing emission reduction contract by supplier.The optimal equilibrium feedback strategy,the optimal trajectory of carbon emissions and the optimal profits of the two scenarios are compared.The result show that when supplier provides emission reduction contract,the carbon emissions of products are lower than those of non-emission reduction contract,and the profits of supplier and manufacturers are higher than those of non-emission reduction contract,thus realizing the coordination of supply chain emission reduction.Finally,the validity of the proposition is further validated by numerical simulation.Through sensitivity analysis of consumer's low carbon preference,carbon trading price and manufacturer's competitiveness,it is found that with the increase of low carbon preference,carbon emissions of products decrease and profits of supplier and manufacturers increase,and that in the planning period,the government should timely adjust the carbon trading policy so as to encourage enterprises to reduce emissions.The competitiveness of manufacturers will also have an impact on carbon emissions of products and profits of both sides.