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A Research On Cost-profit Sharing Contract Of Green Supply Chain Finance Under Carbon Quota Constraint

Posted on:2024-06-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L H XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2531307088951179Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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With the growing concern for environmental protection,reducing carbon emissions has become a central issue,and China has launched the construction of a carbon emission trading market in order to achieve the goal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality.In order to speed up the construction of the national carbon emission trading market and guide production,consumption and investment in the low-carbon direction,the Ministry of Ecological Environment of our country has issued "Management Methods of carbon emission Trading(Trial Implementation)".Carbon quota is the main product of carbon trading market.The quota allocation system is an important policy formulated by the government for the completion of emission control and is the cornerstone to ensure the orderly promotion and smooth operation of the carbon trading market.In the context of carbon trading market,the trading system limits the amount of carbon emissions of enterprises within a certain period of time.Each enterprise is given a certain amount of quota,and if the emissions exceed the standard,it will face punishment or be forced to buy excess quota from the trading market.Enterprises consider green emission reduction technology investment to meet the carbon reduction target,but often face financial constraints due to insufficient funds or poor turnover.Due to the differences in marginal cost of carbon emission reduction among enterprises,enterprises in the supply chain may face numerous problems or unsatisfactory optimization effects if they only rely on their own capabilities to optimize carbon emission reduction schemes.If the supply chain as a whole is started,upstream and downstream enterprises participate in joint emission reduction schemes,or the optimal allocation of carbon emission rights in the supply chain may be realized.Second,smes have long faced difficulties in financing.As they are the backbone of the low-carbon and green transformation of the economy,they urgently need funds to support their low-carbon and green transformation.The rise of green supply chain finance can fully mobilize the lowcarbon and green transformation of inclusive medium,small and micro enterprises,promote energy conservation and emission reduction in related industries,and help break the financing dilemma caused by environmental constraints,so as to achieve the "double carbon" goal proposed by the state.In this thesis,from the perspective of green supply chain,a two-stage lowcarbon supply chain model dominated by retailers is established based on game theory and considering carbon cap-and-trade system and capital constraints.In this model,the manufacturer is an enterprise that bears the cost of emission reduction due to the production of green goods.First of all,this paper assumes that the manufacturer has enough capital for emission reduction investment.Stackelberg game is used to solve the model to get the conditions of the manufacturer’s capital constraints,and then the green financing contract model was established based on the capital constraints.Two cases of participating in green financing and not participating in green financing were considered.Secondly,to coordinate the efficiency of supply chain,the benefit and cost sharing contract is introduced.Similarly,the condition of capital constraint is obtained by solving the basic game model,and then the green financing model under the benefit and cost sharing contract is established.They are participating in the benefit and cost sharing contract but not participating in green financing and participating in the benefit and cost sharing while participating in green financing.Using backward induction,we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and returns of the participants in four cases.And through MATLAB numerical analysis to confirm the conclusion.It is found that when the green financing interest rate is high,the optimal inventory level of retailers is lower;When the green financing rate is low,the optimal carbon reduction level of the manufacturer is high.At the same time,the cost sharing and profit sharing of retailers will have a positive impact on the carbon emission reduction efficiency of manufacturers,and the profits of manufacturers and retailers can achieve potential Pareto improvement.When the retailer is an inefficient retailer,the manufacturer’s optimal level of carbon abatement increases with the retailer’s cost sharing and decreases with the profit share retained by the retailer.
Keywords/Search Tags:Green supply chain finance, Carbon reduction, Capital constraints, Cost-sharing contracts, Dynamic game
PDF Full Text Request
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