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Game Analysis Of Enterprise Low-carbon Cooperative Emission Reduction In Three-dimensional Trading Patterns

Posted on:2021-02-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:E F XingFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330605467603Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Due to the continuous deterioration of the global ecological environment,low-carbon emission reduction has gradually become a hot issue worldwide.Nowadays,the competition among enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition among supply chains.Therefore,it is the original intention of this study to design the supply chain enterprise contract to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and realize the unification of social benefits and economic benefits.As a manufacturing power,China’s manufacturing GDP alone accounts for more than 50% of its total GDP.However,China is still in the low-end manufacturing stage with high energy consumption.Therefore,in order to ensure that China’s manufacturing industry can timely adapt to the rapidly changing market environment and realize the emission reduction commitment under the low-carbon economy,this paper proposes that the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain should cooperate in the emission reduction research and development stage by designing the contract model,sharing the emission reduction costs,and sharing the emission reduction benefits to meet this challenge.Under the low carbon economy,the operation mode of enterprises has evolved from the traditional resource-product two-dimensional trading to the resource-product-carbon emission rights three-dimensional trading mode.Based on the three-dimensional trading patterns including of carbon emission rights,this paper uses game theory to analyze the operation law of low carbon emission reduction of recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain.Firstly,we build a supply chain emission reduction decision model under the three-dimensional transaction patterns.Secondly,according to the number of recyclers under different market demands,the effects of government subsidies,carbon tax,carbon emission reduction capacity,recyclers’ competition coefficient,consumers’ low-carbon preference,carbon emissions,carbon emission trading price and other influencing factors on supply chain enterprises are respectively considered in the model.Finally,the correctness of the conclusion is verified by an example and MATLAB simulation analysis.The results show that,when market demand is certain:(1)the increase of carbon tax can stimulate the enthusiasm of supply chain enterprises to reduce emissions,but the unreasonable carbon tax(too high or too low)cannot play the role of encouraging emission reduction;(2)government subsidies will indirectly improve consumers’ positive awareness of low-carbon emission reduction,improve the recycling efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain for recycling and remanufacturing,and thus stimulate the enthusiasm of supply chain enterprises for low-carbon emission reduction;(3)the improvement of carbon emission reduction capacity will increase the profits of distributors and manufacturers and the profits of the supply chain.The increase of carbon tax is opposite to the improvement of carbon emission reduction capacity;(4)competition among recyclers is beneficial to resource utilization and environmental protection to a certain extent,but excessive competition will lead to reduced profits of enterprises in the supply chain.When market demand is uncertain:(1)carbon emission management brings positive effects on the expected utility of distributors and manufacturers;(2)consistent with the certainty of market demand,the carbon trading price,consumers’ low-carbon preference and the increase of carbon emissions also negatively affect the expected utility of manufacturers and sellers;(3)the competition among third-party recyclers will have a negative impact on third-party recyclers and manufacturers,but the impact of competition is not significant due to the enterprise cost,scale and other reasons;(4)only when the participants of the supply chain in the designed contract cooperation model maintain the spirit of contract cooperation and the government plays the regulatory role can the low-carbon social and economic benefits be maximized.
Keywords/Search Tags:Three-dimensional trading patterns, Carbon emission rights, Game theory, Supply chain decision-making, Contract model
PDF Full Text Request
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