| Since the founding of new China,with the acceleration of economic development and industrialization,China’s ecological and environmental problems have gradually emerged,and environmental pollution that brought by social and economic development has become increasingly prominent.Especially,the problem of industrial pollution is not only concerned by the government,but also increasingly concerned by the public.When the public gradually realized the seriousness of industrial pollution and the importance of environmental protection,their awareness of environmental protection gradually strengthened,and consistent public environmental protection actions also increased,such as joining in community environmental protection activities,public environmental protection letters and complaints,and public environmental protection demonstrations.Industrial pollution has always been an important ecological and environmental issue which is concerned by the state,and it is also related to the basic living environment of the people.The study of industrial pollution involves different research contents and perspectives,including environmental regulation by the government and investment efficiency in industrial pollution control,environmental pollution and treatment by enterprises,and how to realize the public’s environmental protection demands.This article mainly from the perspective of public demands,based on the government,enterprises and public interaction,and in order to build the basic logic of industrial pollution,explore and reveal the public environmental protection demands of industrial pollution control.This article will use mathematical and empirical analysis to reveal the influence mechanism and causal relationship between government and public.Specifically,the main research framework of this paper includes theoretical analysis and empirical analysis.In the theoretical analysis,through the principal-agent model and the game model,the influence mechanism of public environmental protection demands on industrial pollution control is revealed.It is concluded that theinformation asymmetry in the game process greatly affects the government’s work efficiency,and the reason of social pressure and cost brought by the public also make government have fewer choices to actively deal with the industrial pollution.Reducing the cost of public participation in pollution prevention and control,improving the expected effect of public participation in pollution prevention and control,improving the psychological expected income of public participation in pollution control and increasing the loss compensation of enterprises to the public are all conducive to improving the effect of industrial pollution control.About the empirical analysis,this paper used the provincial panel data from 2002 to 2016 to analyze the causal relationship between public environmental protection demands and enterprise pollution emissions,so as to illustrate the impact of public environmental protection demands on industrial pollution control.The results of empirical analysis show that the public’s environmental protection appeal has a significant effect on the government’s control of industrial pollution,among which the more the number of petition and Chinese people’s political consultative conference(CPPCC)cases,the more significant the effect of industrial pollution control.In lag issue cases at the same time,not only the public complaint cases and the Chinese people’s political consultative conference(CPPCC)have a positive effect on industrial pollution control,but also the public petitioning.But the results influenced by time effect,in the current the cause of public petitions cumbersome procedures will not affect industrial pollution control but can be a very good effect in next year. |