| Salt is essential to the fiscal revenue and people’s livelihood.Therefore,in ancient China,the state issued a strict management system to standardize the operation of the salt market.The salt distribution system in the Qing dynasty is one of the key points in the socioeconomic history of the Qing dynasty.However,previous studies mainly focused on the interpretation of regulations.Institutional analysis should not be a study of interpreting game rules,but a study of investigating individual responses to the rules.This paper investigates the deeds of merchants,officials,bootleggers and civilians in salt industry in Shanxi province,to discuss how the leading players of social games shape the direction of institutional change from the perspective of socioeconomic history.The paper argues that:(1)The initial institutional equilibrium of salt distribution in Shanxi province from 1736 to 1820 was that the salt distribution system was adapted to local conditions.Monopolized system in southern Shanxi,free marketing system in northern Shanxi.(2)In the middle of Qianlong period,the institutional equilibrium was distorted.Under the condition of Hai salt output and quality declined,the merchants transported the Mongolian salt on a large scale and then shipped it to southern Shanxi for sale,which made it difficult for the monopolized system to continue.In the middle and later period of Qianlong,the Qing government corrected the deviation of Shanxi salt distribution system.Qing government officials took measures to restrict the sale of Mongolian salt.(3)In 1792,the salt distribution system in Shanxi changed,and the system of salt free marketing was implemented throughout the province.Institutional change had triggered the role transformation of relevant stakeholders,and Lianghuai salt administration officials became one of the key roles in institutional change,and the attitude of the emperor also changed.(4)In1807,salt monopoly system implemented in Shanxi.In terms of performance evaluation,the distribution system of middle and north Shanxi was not running effectively.So in 1813 the Qing government re-implemented the free distribution system.Although the salt monopoly system in south Shanxi was running well at the beginning,its operating efficiency gradually declined,which foreshadowed the crisis of the salt administration during the reign of Daoguang.The research shows that although the institution sets rules for social games,each interest subject will carry out cost-benefit analysis from its own perspective.Based on the analysis results,even if people acquiesce in the authority of the state,they will seek their own interests in a way that may not strictly conform to the national laws.Under different institutional backgrounds,each interest subject plays and changes its role in the institutional change,shaping the direction of institutional change. |