Research On The Behavior Of Local Government In Economic Development

In the context of government competition,local governments often adopt a series of measures to promote the economic development of their region.These include both general measures in the general environment and personalized measures based on local characteristics.This article focuses on the former—the common behavior of government behavior in local economic development.At the same time,with the continuous advancement of fiscal decentralization,local governments have more and more fiscal autonomy,and the central government has given appropriate local tax administration powers to allow local governments to take certain tax subsidies and preferential measures.In addition,if the government wants to provide high-quality public goods and services,it is necessary to increase fiscal expenditure.Therefore,in the context of combining fiscal decentralization and government competition,the common approach adopted by local governments to promote economic development in the region is to start with taxation,fiscal expenditure,and policy use.Then,what kind of impact will a series of actions such as taxation,expenditure and use of policy have on economic development,and what is its influence?This article analyzes the current state of government behavior in China's taxation,fiscal expenditure,and policy use.It is found that in order to stimulate the economic development of the region,China's local governments are intensifying their governance in these three areas to compete and attract resources.At the same time,there are also some problems that make the government's competitive behavior not completely achieve the purpose of promoting economic development.Since then,this paper selects the government tax,expenditure and GDP data of 30 provinces in China from 2010 to 2017 as samples,and uses spatial econometric models to test that the interaction between tax,fiscal expenditure and GDP growth rate does exist.At the same time,the empirical results show that the tax level of a certain area has a negative correlation with the local per capital real GDP,while the tax level of the neighboring areas has a positive correlation with the real per capital GDP of the local area,and the tax burden is reduced to the economy The driving force of growth is far greater than the resistance to the provision of public services by the reduction of tax revenue.The fiscal expenditure of local governments will have a positive effect on economic growth,and the strategic interaction between fiscal expenditures between regions and economic growth is not significant.The author believes that this phenomenon may be caused by the current local governments 'fiscal expenditure Structural deviations may be widespread.Combining empirical results,this article draws several conclusions: First,competition between local governments on taxation and fiscal expenditure does exist;second,tax competition and preferential taxation will play a certain role in promoting regional economic development,and government finance Expenditure competition is subject to structural deviations,and the positive effects brought by expenditure are greatly weakened.Third,in the use of local government policies,there are phenomena of local protectionism and emphasis on quantity and quality,and the comprehensive benefits of economic development have been ignored.Finally,the author comprehensively analyzes the empirical results and the foregoing analysis of the current problems and causes of local government behavior in China,and puts forward the following suggestions: 1.Reasonably use tax competition in the context of fiscal decentralization to avoid malicious tax cuts;2.Pay attention to government The role of expenditure in stimulating economic development and optimizing the structure of expenditures;Third,to face other comprehensive benefits behind economic growth and develop in an all-round way;Fourth,to formulate policies scientifically and find the government's own positioning.