| In recent years,the problem of global warming is becoming more and more serious,which has gradually become one of the hot topics with high concern in the international community.The manufacture,the main part to promote society development,makes an important contribution to the development of the society and economy.At the same time,it will produce vast amount of CO2 in the production,processing,warehousing and transportation processes.According to the relevant data,in 2011,China’s industrial sector totally produced more than 2.5 billion tons of carbon emissions and manufacturing accounted for nearly 60%.With the increasing of global climate warming trend,the climate problem caused by CO2 has been threatening the survival and development of mankind.Therefore,it has became a common sense for each country to put forward a series of carbon emission policies to solve the problems of greenhouse gas emissions,such as carbon tax,carbon cap,carbon cap-and-trade policies.As a country with large carbon emissions,China has also made unremitting efforts to reduce carbon dioxide.It has committed to reduce carbon emissions by 40%-45%per unit GDP in 2020,and actively carried out the pilot work of carbon trading mechanism.As consumer awareness of environmental protection continues to increase,more and more consumers tend to buy the environment-friendly products.Faced with the carbon emission policies and the consumers’environment-friendly awareness,supply chain enterprises enters into new operation mode.This brings challenges to the traditional supply chain,which is centered on economic efficiency before.With the development of behavioral economy,a large number of economic activities and experiments show that decision-makers are not completely rational,who will overestimate their knowledge and ability when making decisions,namely overconfident(Fischoff B.,1977;Camerer C.F.,1999).However,the existing supply chain operation management researches considering the decision-maker’s behaviors mainly focus on fairness concern,altruism preference,loss avoidance and so on.There are only a few related researches considering the decision-maker’s overconfident behavior.What’s more,there are nearly no researchers considering the decision-maker’s overconfidence in the low-carbon supply chain.Based on the previous researches,this paper leads the retailer’s overconfidence into the low-carbon supply chain and builds a supply chain system consisting of a rational manufacture and an overconfident retailer,to study its operation decisions and coordination under the condition of complete and incomplete information.This paper is mainly about two parts.The first part leads the retailer’s overconfidence into the low-carbon supply chain considering the carbon cap-and-trade policy,and builds a two-echelon game model under the retailer’s overconfidence information as complete information.What’s more,this part designs a revenue sharing-bilateral cost sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.Based on the first part,the second part extended the model into the condition of incomplete information to further study the incomplete information’s influence on the supply chain members’decisions and performances.The first part indicates that under the condition of retailer’s overconfidence level as complete information,(1)compared with the centralized decision-making model,the optimized low-carbon technology level and the optimized sale-effort level are lower in the decentralized decision-making model,but higher for the optimized sale price of per unit product;(2)in the decentralized decision-making model,the optimized wholesale price and the optimized sale-price are influenced by the interaction of retailer’s overconfident level and carbon price,while not for the optimized low-carbon technology level;(3)in the decentralized decision-making model,as the increasing of retailer’s overconfident level,the profits of the supply chain members and the whole supply chain decrease,but the retailer’s utility increase;(4)for the system’s profit under the decentralized decision-making model is lower than the corresponding value of the centralized condition,the manufacture can design a reasonable revenue-sharing and bilateral cost-sharing contract and adjust it dynamically according to the actual overconfidence level and the carbon trading price to improve the supply chain members’ performances,as a result to realize the supply chain coordination.The second part indicates that under the condition of retailer’s overconfidence level as incomplete information,(1)compared with the condition of the retailer’s overconfidence level as complete information,the retailer’s profit is higher in the condition of incomplete information,while the manufacture’s and system’s profits are lower;(2)compared with the condition of the retailer’s overconfidence level as complete information,the optimized low-carbon technology level and sale-effort level are lower under the condition of incomplete information,while the comparisons of the optimized sale-price and wholesale-price are determined by the carbon trading price;(3)in the condition of the retailer’s overconfidence level as complete information and incomplete information,the deviation of the manufacture’s optimized low-carbon technology level increases by the higher carbon price,so dose the retailer’s optimized sale-effort level;(4)for the system’s profit under the decentralized decision-making model is lower than the corresponding value of the centralized condition as the second part,the manufacture can design a reasonable revenue-sharing and bilateral cost-sharing contract and adjust it dynamically according to the degree of the incomplete information and the carbon trading price to improve the supply chain members’ performances,as a result to realize the supply chain coordination. |
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