| With the rapid development of China’s economy,environmental problems are increasingly serious,there are many ecological environment problems in the field of agriculture.In the aspect of agricultural ecological environment management,our government use new policy tools and methods constantly.At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 16 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,the Chinese government proposed for the first time that "according to the principle of who open up,who protects,who benefits,who compensates,accelerate the establishment of ecological compensation mechanism".Since then,China’s ecological compensation policy,as a powerful means of ecological environment governance,has been widely implemented.In the practice of international ecological compensation projects,conservation auction has been widely used.Many scholars have studied that farmers’ bidding behavior is affected by market information and personal characteristics,but few scholars have studied whether the bidding behavior of ecological compensation project participants is affected by the previous bidding results.Therefore,this paper focuses on the analysis of the impact of participants’ auction results on their subsequent bids in multiple rounds of conservation auctions.This study fills in the research gaps of multiple rounds conservation auction and lays the foundation for further exploring the impact of market information on conservation auction.Based on the review of the existing studies,this paper designs a pricing model of multiple rounds of discriminatory price conservation auction by using the research method of experimental economics.In four villages of Chengdu,81 households are invited to participate in the economic experiment and questionnaire survey,observed the bidding behavior of the households in the ecological compensation project,and the influence of auction results on subsequent bids in multi round protection auction is further analyzed by using multiple linear regression model,and the following conclusions are obtained:(1)With the increase of auction rounds,the bidding level of subjects shows a significant downward trend,and the number of successful participants in ecological compensation projects also increases.(2)The auction results have a significant impact on the subsequent bidding behavior of farmers.After the success of the auction,the farmers will have a significant trend to improve the bidding level in the subsequent conservation auction,and after the failure of the previous round of auction,the farmers will reduce the bidding level in the subsequent auction.(3)The conservation auction round has a significant negative impact on the change of farmers’ bidding.With the increase of auction round,the difference and the fluctuation of farmers’ bidding will be smaller.(4)In the conservation auction,the impact of the last round of auction results on the subsequent bids of farmers weakens with the increase of auction rounds.On this basis,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions,such as improving the pricing mechanism of agricultural ecological compensation project,reasonable design and application of conservation auction pricing mechanism and attention to the personal characteristics of participants in ecological projects. |