| After the adoption of open up policy,China’ s economy has achieved rapid development in terms of speed.But the price is large number of pollutant emissions,which had a negative impact on people’s health and normal life.Strengthening environmental governance is necessary for economic sustainability development and people’s livelihood.With the popularization of new media technology and the strong support of national policies,more ordinary people participate in the environmental governance system.Therefore,it is necessary to systematically study the mechanism of public participation in pollution control through new media and the effect of public participation on enterprise emission control.Considering the influence of public opinion on corporate reputation under the background of new media,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model and empirical analysis model of corporate pollution,and discusses the governance mechanism and effect of corporate pollution from both theoretical and empirical aspects.Firstly,this paper combs the evolution trend of public participation in environmental governance policies and ways at home and abroad,divides public participation into traditional way participation and new media way participation from the perspective of using media,and makes a comparative analysis of the characteristics and spatial distribution characteristics of the two ways of participation.The spatial distribution of public participation in China shows the characteristics of more in the East and less in the middle and West,but this difference trend has weakened with the growth of time.Secondly,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between the public and the enterprise under the reputation punishment mechanism.Considering the dynamic effect of the enterprise reputation,this paper introduces a dynamic punishment factor on the basis of the former evolutionary game,and discusses the evolution process of the environmental strategy of the public and the enterprise under the dynamic reputation punishment mechanism,and the influence factors of the system are analyzed by data simulation.It is concluded that: the evolutionary stability strategy of the model under static reputation punishment mechanism is related to the initial strategy of both sides,while there is only {no participation,no treatment}evolutionary stability strategy under dynamic reputation punishment mechanism,in which the cost of pollutant treatment and public participation are directly proportional to the rate of the model reaching the stable state,and the influence of new media and the initial proportion of public participation are inversely proportional to the rate of the model reaching a stable state.Thirdly,according to the environmental management situation of in China,this paper introduces the local government as a subject on the basis of the previous two parties’ evolutionary game,establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model,and discusses the evolution process of environmental strategy of each subject under the dual mechanism of reputation punishment and administrative punishment.It is found that when the system meets certain conditions,it can achieve the ideal state of government led,enterprise subject and public participation in the whole society.Through the data simulation analysis of the influencing factors to achieve the ideal state,it is found that increase of the new media influence,reputation loss,superior government punishment,punishment for illegal pollution discharge of enterprises,government reward and psychological benefits of public participation will promote the stability of the game system,while the decrease of pollutant treatment cost,government supervision cost and public participation convenience index will promote the system to reach a stable state.Finally,based on the relevant panel data from 2016 to 2018,this paper constructs a fixed effect econometric model and analyzes the impact of public participation on enterprise emission control under different participation modes,and makes further research,the regional heterogeneity is tested.The results show that: public reporting on environment has no obvious effect on the emission of industrial wastewater and industrial solid waste,but has a significant inhibitory effect on the emission of industrial waste gas.From the regional heterogeneity test results,we find only in the eastern economically developed areas,public participation can promote the emission control of industrial enterprises,but has less influence on the provinces from central and western.This paper has 27 figures,13 tables and 81 references. |
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