Research On The Supervision Game Of Architectural Engineering Construction Safety Based On System Dynamics

Construction industry as one of the pillar industries in China,it plays an significant role in rasing the living standards of the people,solving the problem of employment and promoting the rapid development of national economy.But at the same time,the construction industry safety accidents occur frequently,the construction safety accident rate remains high,only lower than the transportation and mining industry.The problems existing in the construction safety supervision are the important reasons for the frequent occurrence of construction safety accidents in the construction industry.Because the construction project has a long construction cycle,large investment scale,a large number of construction units,large-scale employees and so on,when safety accidents occur,economic losses,casualties and social impact will be very serious.Therefore,how to effectively solve the problems existing in the construction safety supervision,so as to improve the effect of construction safety supervision and reduce the occurrence of construction safety accidents,is an important problem to be carefully studied and solved.Based on the evolutionary game theory,considering the reputation loss variables,this paper analyzes the dynamic game process and the stability of the equilibrium point of the three main participants(government supervision department,construction unit and supervision party)in the construction safety supervision.In view of the complex dynamics of strategy selection and the huge computational workload in the system evolutionary game model,the dynamic process of the game and the influencing factors of the evolutionary stable strategy are analyzed by means of computer simulation.The results show that: increasing the punishment of the government regulatory department,reducing the rent-seeking income of the supervisor,reducing the supervision cost of the government regulatory department and increasing the fame loss of the construction unit can effectively improve the standardized construction ratio of the construction unit and the strict supervision ratio of the supervisor.Based on this,coming up with the commensurate advice and countermeasures to improve the effect of construction safety supervision and reduce the occurrence of construction safety accidents.Finally,in view of the limited number of participants in the construction process in the actual situation,this paper introduces the selection mutation Moran process to construct the random evolutionary game model of construction safety supervision,and focuses on the analysis of the dynamic of the random evolutionary game between the construction unit and the supervisor and the conditions of the dominant strategy of both sides.The results show that:under the condition of neutral selection,the ratio of each strategy to be selected is the same;under the condition of weak selection,the ratio of the two sides to choose different strategies is not only related to the expected loss,rent-seeking income,cost saving of non standardized construction and other variables,but also related to the selection intensity and mutation probability.And the smaller mutation probability is more conducive to the construction unit to choose the standardized construction strategy,and the supervisor to choose the strict supervision strategy.Further,the results of theoretical analysis are verified by numerical simulation,and the relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.The innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)the evolutionary game theory is introduced to study the construction safety supervision,which makes up for the limitations of the traditional game theory.On the premise of considering the reputation loss variables,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to study the dynamic process and evolutionary stability strategy of the game within and between populations.(2)Combining evolutionary game theory with system dynamics simulation,this paper studies the dynamic process of evolutionary game of construction safety supervision system of construction engineering,simulates and analyzes the factors influencing evolutionary stability strategy,and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to improve the effect of construction safety supervision.(3)By introducing the selection mutation Moran process,this paper studies the dominant conditions of the strategies of the supervisor and the construction company when the number of individuals in the main body population of construction safety supervision is limited,and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions from the perspective of controlling the mutation probability of the strategy selection of both sides.