Research On Incentive Failure Of Employee Stock Ownership Plan In Shanghai Jiahua

With the development of the economy and the continuous improvement of corporate management systems,equity incentives have been widely recognized as an important means of promoting corporate management and motivating employees.Employee stock ownership plan is a new type of equity incentive method.It was initially promoted as an effective measure to promote mixed ownership reform.It has outstanding highlights in reducing agency costs between employees and enterprises,stabilizing the company’s stock price,and adjusting the equity structure.However,due to the immaturity of this incentive model,in the process of implementing employee stock ownership plans,listed companies frequently reported suspension of implementation and failure of incentives,and the overall implementation effect was not good.Therefore,it is of great research value to discuss the problem of the failure of employee stock ownership plan incentives and propose solutions.Based on the research of sharing economy theory,talent capital theory,principal-agent theory,incentive theory and existing legal system,this paper conducts research on the failure of employee stock ownership plan incentives.Taking Shanghai Jiahua as an example,it studies the implementation of employee stock ownership plan.Motivation,plan design and implementation effect,and use event research method and financial indicator analysis method to evaluate its implementation effect.It was found that the employee stock ownership plan did not achieve the motivation motivation and did not achieve the expected purpose.Therefore,the conclusion of incentive failure was reached.Next,in order to explore the reasons for the failure of incentives,this article discusses from the three levels of macro,industry and enterprise,in order to provide a comprehensive and reliable basis for the formulation of the plan.Finally,from the perspective of corporate strategy,this article proposes relevant measures under the needs of operation management,including: understanding the internal and external environment of the company,positioning the plan according to the strategic policy,optimizing the equity structure and agency structure;focusing on corporate development,using stocks Value-added and dividends enhance employees sense of security;clarify the reasons for implementation to avoid blindly following the trend and lose the correct business judgment of the company;optimize employee shareholding plans,diversify the problem of funding sources,rationally arrange the number of shares and shareholding ratios,and accurately determine incentives Target,scientific performance appraisal,appropriate selection of management mode according to the complexity of the plan.Through case analysis,the article clarified the reasons for the implementation of Shanghai Jiahua’s employee stock ownership plan,the reasons for the failure of incentives,and suggestions for optimization of the plan.It has further enriched my country’s incentive theory and related literature,and can be used by high-tech companies in the same industry or the same type.Providing a more comprehensive and systematic reference plan can also provide useful reference for business management and plan optimization.