Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision,corporate Green Innovation And Corporate Economic Performance ——Evidence From Quasi-natural Experiments Based On Environmental Protection Interview

With the rapid development of China’s economy and the continuous improvement of the People’s living standards,the current major social contradiction has been transformed into the contradiction between the people’s growing needs for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development.At the fifth plenary session of the eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made a scientific judgment on the implementation of the strategy of green and sustainable development in order to achieve the development goal of high speed economic growth to high quality economic growth,it is necessary to develop environment-friendly industries and realize the win-win of economic development and environmental protection through environmental regulation.A large number of scholars have carried out research on the impact of Environmental Regulation on Green Innovation and Corporate performance,which has confirmed the effectiveness of Environmental Regulation policies,but in the Environmental Regulation policies implementation,there is the problem of lax supervision.In order to better implement Environmental Regulation policies and achieve high-quality economic growth,it is urgent to explore the impact of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision on Corporate Economic Performance.In 2014 China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection（now the Ministry of Ecological Environment）issued the interim measures of the Ministry of Environmental Protection on the basis of various studies,opening a new chapter of "Supervision of Environmental Protection on Politics",at the same time,it also provides an opportunity to study the impact of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision on Corporate Economic Performance.In order to explore this issue,this study takes the industrial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2010 to 2019 as the research sample,and uses Difference-In-Difference to study the impact of Environmental Protection Interview on Corporate Economic Performance and its mechanism.Through theoretical analysis and empirical test,we find that: On the whole,Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision has a significant negative impact on Corporate Economic Performance,significantly positive impact on Corporate Green Innovation;Corporate Green Innovation has a masking effect between Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision and Corporate Economic Performance.In addition,Corporate Environmental Investment plays a positive regulatory role in regulating the influence of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision on Corporate Green Innovation.Government Subsidy for Environmental Protection plays a negative role in regulating the influence of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision on Corporate Economic Performance.From the aspect of property rights,Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision has significant negative effect on the economic performance of non-state-owned listed industrial corporate.Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision has a significant positive impact on green innovation of state-owned listed industrial corporate.From the aspect of industry characteristics,Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision plays a significant role in promoting green innovation for listed industrial corporate in heavy pollution industries and non-heavy pollution industries,but the listed industrial corporate in non-heavy pollution industries are promoted more significantly.And Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision has a significant restraining effect on the economic performance of corporate,but the impact on heavy pollution industries is more significant.The conclusion enriches the research content of the economic effect of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision,and provides some reference for corporate to choose environmental strategy under the pressure of Environmental Law Enforcement Supervision.