Tripartite Evolutionary Game And Simulation Research On Inclusive Green Growth Of Electrical And Electronic Manufacturer

Inclusive green growth emphasizes the overall coordination of economy,environment as well as society,which provides a practical choice for Chinese electrical and electronic manufacturers(EEM)to solve problems such as resource constraints,environmental pollution and social responsibility fulfillment.However,due to high costs,low short-term benefits and the lack of multi-supervision,EEM lack the initiative to achieve inclusive green growth,thus multi-agent participation is urgently needed.As the maker of environmental regulations,the government plays an important role in promoting inclusive green growth of EEM.Meanwhile,because environmental non-governmental organization(ENGO)supervision can make up for the relatively finite roles of the government in certain respects,ENGO has widely regarded as a third-party environmental supervision subject.Howbeit,existing researches on the relationship between government regulation,ENGO supervision and corporate-level inclusive green growth are mostly empirical or qualitative analysis from a static perspective,which can’t reflect the dynamic evolution path of participants’ strategy choice.Therefore,it is necessary to focus on the inclusive green growth of EEM,and systematically analyze the strategic interaction among the government,EEM and ENGO from the perspective of dynamic game.Taking into account the negative externalities of EEM,the relatively finite roles of the government in certain respects and the increasingly prominent role of ENGO,this paper focuses on "how to promote EEM to achieve inclusive green growth”,and builds the tripartite evolutionary game model.Analyzing the evolutionary stability of the game strategy by solving the constructed game model,so as to clarify the strategic interaction among the game subjects and divide the game process into different stages.Furthermore,through numerical simulation with Matlab R2020 b,this paper firstly verifies the analysis results of game strategy evolutionary stability,and intuitively describes the evolution paths of each game subject in different stages.Secondly,this paper analyzes the relevant parameters of the environmental regulation,ENGO supervision and inclusive green growth of EEM how to influence the strategic choice of each game subject.The results of this paper show that:(1)The government can promote EEM to adopt inclusive green growth pattern by actively implementing market-based environmental regulations,and ENGO supervision has a substitution effect.Meanwhile,the probability of "actively implement" by the government is negatively correlated with the probability of "adopt" by EEM.(2)In the process of evolutionary game,EEM will independently choose the strategy of "adopt" through the period of government-led,government and ENGO synergy as well as ENGO-led.(3)Government subsidies,environmental protection taxes and emissions trading have incentives for the inclusive green growth of EEM,and there are differences in the incentives of different regulatory intensities.Besides,low supervisory costs of ENGO or high subsidies received by ENGO from the government and the public are conducive to synergy between the government and ENGO.In view of this,the government needs to play a leading role and improve the dynamic adjustment mechanism of market-based environmental regulations.ENGO should actively participate in supervision and strengthen their collaboration with the government.EEM ought to clarify their own responsibilities and improve their awareness of environmental protection and social responsibility fulfillment.This study provides decision-making reference and theoretical support for promoting the inclusive green growth of EEM.