Research On Evolution Game And Collaborative Governance Of Network Public Opinion Of CSR Negative Events

The awareness of corporate social responsibility(CSR)has not been fully upgraded to the strategic level,and enterprises cannot assume social responsibility in accordance with the expectations of stakeholders,resulting in frequent negative CSR incidents.With the development of the Internet,the public can use the media to express their views and opinions in real time,quickly form network public opinion,and require enterprises to take measures in the form of network public opinion.The online public opinion of CSR negative events will show different characteristics with the development of the event,and will undergo a series of evolution and diffusion,and eventually change the direction of public opinion in the process of mutual restraint.Therefore,analyzing the interaction of multiple subjects of CSR negative event network public opinion and exploring the collaborative governance model of CSR negative event network public opinion is of great practical significance for enterprises to effectively respond to public opinion crisis,reduce public loss and healthy economic and social development.Based on stakeholder theory,evolutionary game theory and collaborative governance theory,this paper first sorts out the stakeholders in the development process of network public opinion based on relevant research in the existing literature,defines stakeholders as government,enterprise and social forces,constructs an evolutionary game model,analyzes the possible evolutionary stability and equilibrium results of the system after the Jacobian matrix calculation,and obtains the optimal state of the system from the perspective of maximizing the overall benefit.Secondly,through the simulation analysis of the evolution path of government,enterprise and social forces,the influence of the initial willingness of the subject to cooperate and key parameters on the stable and equilibrium results of evolution is discussed.Finally,combined with the case of "Changchun Changsheng Fake Vaccine",the dynamic evolution process of online public opinion of CSR negative events is analyzed,the behavior choices and governance measures of participants in different periods are explored,and the collaborative governance mechanism of online public opinion of CSR negative events is summarized.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)In order to achieve the optimal state of the system,it is necessary to meet the net benefits of social forces not participating in public opinion discussion when the government participates in supervision,and at the same time ensure that the government’s punishment for enterprises not taking the initiative to respond to public opinion is greater than the cost of enterprises actively responding to public opinion,at which time the strategic choice of government,enterprises and social forces is(supervision,active response,non-participation).By increasing the intensity of government supervision alone and enterprises taking the initiative to respond to the cost of public opinion input,the public opinion crisis cannot be effectively alleviated,and at the same time,the government supervision intensity and social forces do not participate in the public opinion discussion gain benefits,and the public opinion heat fades significantly.(2)Under the low initial willingness to cooperate,enterprises fail to make effective responses to public opinion in a timely manner,social forces will continue to exert public opinion pressure on enterprises,and corporate actions lag behind social forces to choose to actively respond to public opinion,showing a state of "tired response".Under the high initial willingness to cooperate,the government increases the punishment and reward of enterprises,the benefits of enterprises actively responding to public opinion are higher than the benefits of not actively responding to public opinion,enterprises will tend to choose to actively respond to public opinion strategy,if enterprises can meet the expected benefits of social forces not participating in public opinion,then social forces will choose not to participate in public opinion discussion,more conducive to achieving a strategic combination(supervision,active response,non-participation).(3)The evolution of online public opinion of CSR negative events can be divided into inducing period,fluctuation period and regression period,and the main behavior of network public opinion in different periods of the "Changchun Changsheng Fake Vaccine Incident" is analyzed,and at this stage,there are problems in the governance of online public opinion with poor linkage between government and social forces,untimely and opaque information disclosure,and single public opinion governance methods,and countermeasures and suggestions for coordinated governance of network public opinion need to give play to the regulatory role of key nodes of the government,guide social forces to participate in public opinion governance and cultivate mutual trust and cooperation governance models.