Channel Intrusion Strategy Of Manufacturer Under Environmental Service Supply Chain

With the prosperous development of e-commerce,opening a direct channel has increasingly become an effective means of competition for manufacturers.In addition to causing channel conflicts with retailers,manufacturers conducting channel intrusion has also increased the demand for manufacturing pollution control while expanding production and sales.At the same time,the third-party environmental service with the characteristics of low cost,profession and efficiency,are gradually purchased by many companies.It is a new issue for manufacturers who implement intrusion strategy to find the best way to cost-effectively control pollution,match the accelerated production pace and avoid environmental regulations.Therefore,this paper firstly analyzes the judgment conditions for manufacturers to opt for pollution outsourcing governance and the superiority of adopting this governance model to overcome the shortcomings of channel intrusion compared with self-pollution-control.The results show that only when the difference level of pollution control efficiency between manufacturers and environmental service providers is higher than a certain critical value,pollution outsourcing is more economical and reasonable than manufacturers’ own pollution control activity,and this model’s cost-saving effect brings higher incremental profits for manufacturers when they performing intrusion strategy,and enlarges the range of retailers benefiting from the intrusion,then leads to channel conflict mitigation,however,it makes retailers obtain higher freerider income from pollution control investment.Second,in view of the operational difficulties,such as the environmental service provider’s dilemma in investing and financing,the retailer’s "free-riding",weak relationships between enterprises and et al existing in the environmental service supply chain system composed of a manufacturer,a retailer and an environmental service provider,we successively take the retailer’s cost-sharing strategy and the manufacturer’s shareholding strategy into consideration,analyze and compare the impact of the two on the manufacturer’s channel intrusion strategy.The research results are as follows:(1)Retailers shares the cost of the pollution control project with environmental service providers can not only eliminate the previous "free-rider" phenomenon,but also improve the decision-making and profit levels of all members of the supply chain,and there exist optimal cost-sharing ratios.After the intrusion,only if when the intensity of competition between the direct channel and the retail channel is lower than a threshold,retailers will carry out sharing cost,and the retailer’s costsharing has a positive and negative impact on channel invasion with this threshold as a borderline,specifically,when the competition intensity of channels is below this threshold,all members,including retailers,benefit from both channel invasion and cost-sharing strategy,and when the relevant constraints are further satisfied,the retailer’s cost sharing strategy can increase the manufacturer’s incremental profit of invasion,which is more incentive for manufacturers to perform channel intrusion;On the contrary,when the competition intensity of channels is higher than this threshold,compared with before cost-sharing,the retailer,who has already implemented cost-sharing strategy under the single-channel situation,gains a narrower benefit range and a lower utility value in the damaged range after the manufacturer channel intrusion,in this case,forcible invasion by the manufacturer will only aggravate the deterioration of its relationship with the retailer.(2)What the manufacturer holds the environmental service provider’s pollution control project shares weakens the double marginal effect with bilateral partners and optimizes the optimal decision-making and profit of each enterprise.The strong and weak profitmaking environmental service providers,in which shares are held,whose profits respectively show a positive correlation and an inverted U-shaped change relationship with the shareholding ratio.Equity cooperation under the dual-channel model is the strongest profit model for manufacturers and environmental service providers,and if the shareholding strategy that meets the relevant conditions is properly implemented,the manufacturer will gain more incremental profits from invasion compared to the case of no shareholding,at the same time,the benefit range of the retailer expands,which is to say,the external effect brought by the implementation of the shareholding strategy enhances the manufacturer’s motive for invasion In addition,the greater the shareholding ratio after the channel intrusion,the more the Pareto win-win range for all members to benefit from the intrusion will be expanded.(3)Under a single retail channel,it is suitable to adopt the retailer’s cost-sharing strategy,on the contrary,it is preferable to adopt the manufacturer’s shareholding strategy whose shareholding ratio is higher than a certain value after the channel intrusion.