Research On Green Supply Chain Decision-Making Considering Government Subsidies And Fairness Concerns

At present,the rapid development of market economy has caused many ecological and environmental problems,such as energy shortages,environmental pollution,and so on.With the increasing attention paid by the international community to environmental issues,China is also actively implementing environmental protection strategies such as sustainable development strategies and green innovation strategies to address the deteriorating ecological environment.With the continuous changes in the overall environment,consumers are becoming more aware of environmental protection,and the level of green products has become one of the factors affecting consumers’ purchase.In this context,enterprises actively respond to the call of the country,meet market demand,incorporate environmental protection principles into their development,and continuously practice the green economy.The development of green supply chains is imperative.The government has implemented a number of preferential policies to encourage the development of a green economy,including financial subsidies.However,the decision-making of enterprises in green supply chains is not only influenced by government subsidy strategies,but also influenced by the fairness concerns that enterprises may have when making decisions due to market uncertainty.The corporate behavior caused by this psychology also affects decision-making.Based on this,this paper will study green supply chain decision-making under the joint influence of government subsidies and equity concerns.This paper considers a two-level green supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers and dominated by manufacturers.Under different government subsidies,a Stackelberg game model is constructed for different fairness concerns,to analyze the specific impact of fairness concerns and different government subsidy strategies on the green supply chain.The research results show that:(1)The fairness concern behavior of any supply chain member will reduce the green level of the product,and the fairness concern has a weakening impact on the retailer’s sales efforts.(2)Manufacturers’ fairness concerns always increase wholesale and retail prices in the market,while retailers’ concern behaviors reduce wholesale and retail prices in the market,making them more friendly to consumers of green products.(3)The fair concern behavior of one supply chain member is always beneficial to the improvement of one’s own profit level,but causes harm to the profits of the other member;Centralized decision-making makes the performance of the supply chain optimal.Under decentralized decision-making,manufacturers’ equity concerns are beneficial to the improvement of the overall profit of the supply chain,while the impact of retailers’ concerns on the overall profit is closely related to their level of equity concerns.(4)Government subsidies have a positive incentive effect on product greenness,retailers’ sales efforts,and supply chain members’ profits,indicating that government subsidies have a positive effect on the development of green supply chains.(5)Different government subsidy methods have different subsidy effects.Subsidized manufacturers have a higher level of product greenness,while subsidized retailers have a higher level of sales effort.In terms of member profits and overall supply chain profits,government subsidized retailers have a better effect.When both parties are fair and neutral under government subsidies or retailers are fair and concerned,the higher the government subsidy coefficient,the smaller the profit gap between manufacturers and retailers,indicating that increasing government subsidies has a certain effect on mitigating fairness concerns in these two situations,while increasing subsidies in other situations is not conducive to mitigating fairness concerns.