Carbon Market Trading Model And Initial Quota Optimization Strategy Based On Non-cooperative Gam

To control greenhouse gas emissions,China has set a strategic goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and has implemented a carbon trading mechanism to incentivize provinces,regions,and enterprises to work together to reduce emissions.The power sector,the largest source of carbon emissions,is allocated initial carbon allowances according to production in each province and region.The power generation enterprises in each province,in turn,are organized to operate under the coordination of the power grid.This brings about interactions and linkages between the operation of the electricity market and the operation of the carbon trading market,as well as conflicts of interest between the provinces and regions to carry out concerted emissions reductions.Therefore,there is a need to decouple the operating electricity market from the carbon trading market and to approach the carbon neutrality target in a cyclical and phased manner.The main research work done in this study is as follows.Firstly,based on non-cooperative game theory,a decision-making model for government-led emission reduction by thermal power enterprises is established to achieve decoupling in the operation of the two markets.In order to achieve orderly emission reduction in the power industry,this study adopts a rolling horizon optimization approach and constructs a mechanism for selecting the equilibrium point of the supply-side game for thermal power enterprises in order to achieve a predetermined carbon intensity target in a phased manner.The model aims to reduce the deviation between the carbon intensity of the power generation industry and the target value while ensuring the supply of thermal power enterprises in order to maintain the stable operation of the electricity market.Secondly,carbon leakage in cross-provincial electricity transmission is further considered and a carbon allowance allocation model based on regional allowance compensation is constructed.Based on the game between clean energy enterprises and thermal power enterprises,the amount of allowance compensation for each region is determined through a quasi-input-output model to promote the relative fairness of allowance allocation.The model aims to mitigate the impact of carbon leakage in inter-provincial transmission on the overall carbon compliance cost and to promote an orderly reduction in the overall carbon compliance cost in the process of approaching the carbon neutrality target in a sub-cycle.Thirdly,the proposed model and optimization method are used to derive an optimization strategy for the initial allowance allocation in the power generation industry.Based on the current statistical data related to the power generation industry,the initial carbon allowance allocation scheme for China’s power generation industry is optimally solved.The optimization results show that in the short term,the strategy can reduce carbon intensity in an orderly manner during the planning period and can track changes in market structure.In the long term,the strategy can reduce the total carbon compliance cost by 1.19×10¹⁰ yuan under the allowance compensation mechanism and can reduce the deviation from the carbon intensity target sufficiently to meet the expected emission reduction target for the power generation industry.