Analysis On Energy Saving And Carbon Reduction Behavior Evolution Of Energy Consuming Enterprises Under The Environment Of A Joint Power-Carbon Market

Climate warming caused by industrial carbon emission is a critical problem confronted by human society.China has made promise on carbon peaking and carbon neutral for the international community.To achieve this target,it is important to promote energy consuming enterprises to save energy and reduce carbon.The incentive tariffs in the power market and carbon quota and price in the carbon market will have a synergistic effect on energy consuming enterprises’ energy saving and carbon reduction behavior.Therefore,it is significant to study the evolution of energy saving and carbon reducing behavior of energy consuming enterprises in a joint power-carbon market under the constraints of power and carbon cost at different stages,in order to determine the incentive factors of power and carbon price in a joint power-carbon market and promote the clean and low-carbon transformation of energy consuming enterprises.Thus,this paper takes the energy consuming enterprises as the research object,and uses the incompletely rational evolutionary game theory and the stochastic evolutionary game theory considering random interference to quantitatively analyze the combination of energy saving and carbon reduction game behavior of energy consuming enterprises in a joint power-carbon market under different stage goals.This paper mainly does the following research:(1)According to the scale and type of energy consumption,energy consuming enterprises are divided into high energy consuming enterprises and common energy consuming enterprises.And the two types of energy consuming enterprises have different power price incentive coefficients and free carbon quota in the game environment,and then the limited rationality evolutionary game theory is used to establish a dynamic evolution game model of energy conservation and carbon reduction of high energy consuming enterprises and common energy consuming enterprises.Then,the evolutionary stability of the energy saving and carbon reduction behavior strategies of the two types of energy consuming enterprises is analyzed by using the differential equation stability theorem.In addition,the game law of the evolution of policy tools such as power price incentive coefficient and market instruments such as carbon market price in the process of achieving the goal of "double carbon" at different stages is obtained through the analysis of calculation cases.Eventually,combined with the game results,the study provides decision reference suggestions on the determination of incentive tariffs and carbon quota for different stages of reaching the goals.(2)In view of the random disturbances in the real environment such as the internal factors of the system such as the risk awareness and cognitive ability of energy consuming enterprises and the external environmental factors such as market regulation,macro policies and regulations,and social interests on the evolutionary stability of energy saving and carbon reduction behavioral decisions of the two groups.This paper adds random interference terms that meet Gaussian assumptions and obeys normal distribution to improve the game model,and uses stochastic differential equations and other related theories to establish a stochastic differential game model for energy conservation and carbon reduction of energy consuming enterprises.Then,on this basis,the evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is solved by combining the theory of stochastic differential equations and an arithmetic analysis is performed.Final,the study obtained the correlation between the systematic dynamic evolutionary trajectory of energy consuming enterprises’ strategy choice and the initial ratio of strategy,power price incentive coefficient,and carbon price in the carbon market,and established the qualitative and quantitative relationships between the intensity of stochastic disturbances and the degree of change and convergence speed of strategy choice.