The Influence Of Offender Intention And Third-party Intervention Behavior Selectivity On Third-party Intervention Behavio

Social norms are the cornerstone of social development and progress,and how to maintain it has been the focus of research in this field in recent years.The third party dictator game paradigm can separate the self-interested motives of the interveners,so the psychological mechanism of the third party intervention can be deeply discussed.Studies have shown that the third party will not only consider the results of the violation,but also consider whether the violator has the intention and the quality of the intention.Intentional Ultimatum Game(Intentional UG)can well manipulate violators’ intentions.Based on high-cost signaling theory and indirect reciprocity theory,the reputational benefits of the intervention are taken into account when the third party intervenes.Third-party intervention behaviors mainly include third-party punitive behaviors and third-party compensatory behaviors,which have distinct psychological mechanisms behind them and can bring different reputational benefits to third parties.Therefore,third parties will have certain preferences in making intervention behaviors,and such preferences vary inconsistently between not free to choose and free to choose of third-party intervention behaviors.Therefore,this study uses an experimental paradigm combining a third-party dictator game and an intention UG to examine the influence of violator intention on third-party intervention behavior and to further reveal whether third-party intervention is free to choose and the role of reputational context in this influence.This study consists of two experiments,in which the third parties were not free to choose in Experiment 1,i.e.,the third party can only choose between punishing the violator and retaining(no punishment)or compensating the victim and retaining(no compensation).In this experiment,the allocator chooses from two options,and this choice may be based on either good or bad intentions.A third party is confronted with the allocator’s choice and makes an inference about the intention behind this choice,which leads to a decision to intervene or not to intervene.The third parties were free to choose in Experiment 2,i.e.,the third party was free to choose between punishing the violator,compensating the victim,and retaining,while the third party made this choice under conditions of anonymity or publicity,respectively.The following results and conclusions were drawn from this study.(1)When third parties’ interventions were not free to choose,the main effect of fairness was significant: the rate and amount of third-party interventions in the unfair condition were significantly higher than those in the fair condition;the main effect of intention was significant: both the rate and amount of third-party interventions in the condition where the violator with bad intention were significantly higher than the violator with good intention.The interaction between reputational context and intervention mode was significant: the compensation rate of third parties was higher than the punishment rate of third parties in the public condition;the punishment rate of third parties was higher than the compensation rate of third parties in the anonymous condition.(2)When third parties’ interventions were free to choose,the main effect of fairness is significant: the rate and amount of third-party intervention in the unfair condition is significantly higher than the rate and amount of third-party intervention in the fair condition;the main effect of intention is significant: the rate of third-party intervention in the condition that the violator with bad intention is significantly higher than the rate of third-party intervention in the condition that the violator with good intention;the main effect of intervention mode is significant: the rate and amount of third-party compensation were significantly higher than the rate and amount of third-party punishment.The interaction between fairness and intervention mode was significant: the third-party compensation rate and amount were significantly higher than those of the third-party punishment’s;the third-party compensation rate and amount were also significantly higher than that of third-party punishment’s in the unfairness condition,but the gap between the third-party compensation behavior and punishment behavior was larger at this condition.In conclusion,the results of this study suggest that third parties make intervention not only take the fairness of the final outcome into account,but also the violator’s intentions.When third-party interventions were not free to choose and under public conditions,third parties minimize their punitive behaviors and increase their compensatory behaviors.This suggests that third-party compensation brings better reputation to the third parties and helps to maintain their image,so the third party also prefers to compensate under the public condition,while the fact that third-party punishment is more frequent than third-party compensation under the anonymous condition may reflect the fact that third-party punishment involves emotional catharsis,while third-party compensation does not.When third parties are free to choose the intervention method,the third-party compensatory behavior is significantly more than the third-party punitive behavior,which may reflect the third-party preference for the intervention method as well.The results of this study extend the inequity aversion theory and also provide some experimental basis for the high cost signaling theory and indirect reciprocity theory;moreover,this study has important practical implications for both the promotion of third-party intervention behavior and the maintenance of social norms.