Research On The Safety Control & Official Governing Of Sociotechnical Systems

Starting with the introduction of the current deteriorating production safety status along with its destructive influence, this dissertation discusses the relationship between Production Accidents and Safety Control of Sociotechnical Systems with the support of natural philosophy and brings forward a suggestion that effective control is the object of research on Safety Control, and that some accidents are not preventable from the preventable point of view of safety philosophy. Fluctuation of the effectiveness of safety control is the prelude of accidents.With that as the base, the Soft Systems Methodology is introduced to explain the Safety Control of Sociotechnical Systems. The principle of Complex Systemism is applied to build the dynamic model of coordinating course on the Safety Control and to reveal the connections among various factors that are influential to the safety management. This dynamic model has laid structural foundation to the emulation test of systemic safety management, which can provide scientific assistance to China's future industrial safety sector.Second, an inner micro-mutual systematic model is built according to the information transfer principle, which points out the quantitative relation between information transfer and coordination of safety control. Also coordination of subjects in safety control is described in the following aspects: formation of information body, investment on information, cooperation among subjects and improvement of safety control.As an empirical case study, the quantitative relationship between the information body and system capacity in the Offshore Oil Platform is studied with the tool of ADL econometric model. The result of the analysis discovers an interactive behavior and long-term relation, through which the author would like to promote a deeper and more extensive research on the industrial safety management.Last but not the least, game theory is adopted on the research of government supervision strategies for China's industrial safety sector. By studying the game behavior of industrial enterprises and the third party organizations, the paper discloses that a new healthy government safety supervision system relies on establishing scientific and effective regulations. At the same time moderate penalty factors have to be set up to improve the enforcement of the safety supervision.