The Psychological Causality Of Contemporary Materialism And Its Solution

The mental causal problem "the possibility of the causal-role of consciousness or mind" has been made the object of philosophical study out of the conflicts between science and common sense. The former demonstrates to us that the cause for any physical effects is physical whereas the latter attributes our behaviors to mental causes, from which two propositions come into being thereby:"physical effects have physical causes" and "physical effects have mental causes". These two propositions prompt a philosophical reflection, that is, the relation between physical and mental causes for the same physical effect and their identity, which leaves both contemporary materialist philosophy of mind and Marxist consciousness theory in a dilemma, for clinging to the identity of the two causes might fall into identity theory or reductionism, i.e. a kind of vulgar materialism and, while persistence in the difference of the two, halfway materialism, descendant to some form of dualism. Marxist consciousness theory may never shun this predicament though it is contemporary philosophy of mind that is questioned in the problem of mental causality by epiphenomenalists.The study of mental causal problem in contemporary materialist philosophy of mind has deepened and extended people’s understanding of mental causality. Besides, the strategy contemporary materialist philosophy of mind applies in the solution to the problem is worth studying in methodology. Moreover, the display of Marxist consciousness theory with some philosophical concepts, modes of thinking and research methods of contemporary materialist philosophy of mind not only helps clarify problems being interpreted presently to reveal the true colors of Marxist mental causal theory, but also facilitates the advancement of Marxist mental causal theory.This thesis centers in the mental causal problem. While combing and exploring contemporary materialist mental causal theories and having analyzed almost all the findings in this field, it makes tentative answers to the problem.Chapter One mainly talks about the origin and contemporary focus of mental causal study. Genetically, people began to pay extensive attention to and study mental causal problem from the sharp conflict between Descartes’ substance dualism and interaction theory. Though mind as a substance has been abandoned in the philosophical system of contemporary materialism, mind or consciousness as the property of the brain remains. Therefore, the new form of mental causal problem contemporary materialist philosophy of mind is facing is whether the mental or physical property of the brain is relevant to behavioral effects in brain’s causal-role in behavior.Chapter Two is about the three contemporary problems in mental causality. Epiphenomenalists posed three main problems for contemporary materialist philosophy of mind on whether mental properties possess causal relevance based on various criteria of properties of causal relevance and irrelevance. The first problem is about mental anomalism. Mental properties are free and will not appear in rigid laws, so they do not possess causal relevance. The second problem is about causal exclusion. Mental properties cannot be ontologically reduced to physical properties only which can be relevant to themselves, so mental properties would be excluded by physical properties. The third is the threat from externalism. Only when it is internal of the causal event can a property possesses the causal relevance; but intentional mental property belongs to the external mover and does not possess causal relevance.Chapters Three and Four have the discussion on two prerequisites closely related to mental causal problem, the status of mind in nature and "metaphysical problems" of mental causality, that is, the problems of causal relationship and identical relationship itself. In terms of the status of mind in nature, only non-reductive materialism persistent in the difference of mental properties from physical properties possesses mental causal problem. As far as the metaphysical causality, some process theory about causality should be insisted to understand causal-role mechanism of mind-matter. And identical relationship itself should be demarcated clearly in order to figure out whether mental and physical causes are identical.Chapters Five, Six and Seven answer the three problems in Chapter Two. Though philosophers adopted various strategies according to different focuses and theoretical basis, their methods could fall into three major categories. Firstly, the view against epiphenomenalism is based on the logic self-consistence of the arguments of anomalism, irreducibility and externalism of mental properties. Secondly, arguments from absurdity, that is, if mental properties, as is pointed out by epiphenomenalists, cannot appear in rigid laws or be reduced to physical properties, they do not possess causal relevance. Then the following logical deduction is bound to be all the macro-phenomena including mental phenomenon do not possess causal relevance, which cannot be accepted by most people, so the premise that mental property is epiphenomenal does not exist. Thirdly, to prove the criteria for causal relevant properties epiphenomenalists hold are flawed according to specific materialist theories, and to think of the solution accordingly. Contemporary materialist philosophy of mind tries to respond to epiphenomenalists’ challenges so as to maintain the fundamental position of non-reductive materialism in mental causality.Chapter Eight expounds how to develop Marxist mental causal theories through the conversation with contemporary materialist mental causal theories. To be more specific, firstly, we could base the new interpretation of mind-brain relationship theories, metaphysical causality theories and active consciousness theories in Marxist consciousness on the classics to clarify the previous misinterpretation. Secondly, we should absorb and transform the reasonable factors in teleological functionalism, advance Marxist theories of mind-brain relationship, and use theory of energy conservation to explain back Marxist metaphysical causality theory. Finally we might be able to provide a possible way out for the mental causal problem for both Marxist consciousness theory and contemporary materialist philosophy of mind within the framework of the former through the analysis of conceptual differences of "different mind-matter properties" and "dualism".