Research On The Credit Governance Of Construction Enterprise

As the direct manufacturer in construction projects, the credit of constructionenterprise has a great influence on projects’ quality during the stages of manufactureand operation. Dishonesty behaviors greatly increase the cost of supervise and restrain,and have negative effects on organizational performance. Therefore, based on thetheory of synergetics, this paper focus on the construction enterprise credit, andexploit the definitions and characteristics of construction enterprise credit, behavioraldecision mechanism, evaluation system and methods, and supervise model. Then, weexpect the relative results will provide theoretical support for regulating Constructionenterprise credit behaviors, improving the organizational performance and the systemefficiency of social credit system.The main research results and innovations are summarized as follows:(1) Based on analysis of construction enterprise credit definition and the sourcesof dishonesty, the synergetic governance system of contractors was developed. Thenstakeholders of the contractor were identified by social network analysis, the resultsshowed that the core stakeholders include client and supervisor, the dormantstakeholders include supplier and subcontractor, and the marginal are government,bank, the public and staff.(2)By comprehensive literature review, this paper identified internal and externalfactors influencing construction enterprise credit behaviors. Based on this,relationships among the identified internal factors were discussed, then functionalmechanism between the internal and the outside were investigated.(3) Through factor analysis, four groups were elicited; they are technical ability,economic ability, managerial ability and reputation level. Based on this, this paperevaluated the contractor credit with the fuzzy matter-element from the perspective ofgovernment. And the evaluation system’s validity was confirmed.(4) Considering multi-stakeholders and linguistic assessment information, thispaper developed a contractor credit assessment model by two-tuple. Combined withTOPSIS, group decision making was obtained. Additionaly, this method was provedfeasible and valid by empirical research. The results showed that: the credit evaluationresults from the perspectives of stakeholders are more reasonable, which reduce theone-sidedness of single stakeholder’s evaluation.(5) In order to govern construction enterprise credit and behavior, a multi-task coordination incentive model was proposed to analyze how to provide balancedincentive contract from multiple dimensions. And the paper gets the threshold-basedmotivation contracts which have the optimal incentive of construction period andquality. Meanwhile, based on evolutionary game and replicator dynamics, this paperresearched the strategy choice in the situation where supervisor and contractor don’tconspire. This paper used evolutionary game theory to analyze strategy choicebehaviors on the interaction between contractors or between the supervisor and thecontractor. Results indicated that: the contractor will have a low level of credit whenhe could benefit greater than honest with little penalty, or the cost of supervise isextremely high. The analogue simulation also presented that a positive correlation isbetween the efforts of supervisor and owner’s stimulation. Punitive measures onconstructor can be effective only within a limited period while constructor’s creditstill fluctuates regularly in the long run. Dynamic punishment mechanism could be aneffective resolution to the fluctuation.